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PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING AS MISPRESCRIPTION 
Fabio Arcila, Jr.† 
“I want to know where the judge has the power to control discovery in 
the rules. That’s—I should know that. I can’t remember my civil 
procedure course. Probably, it was taught on day 4.”—Justice Breyer.1 
“Justice Scalia: what’s driving [Iqbal] is discovery, ‘especially in an 
age of electronic discovery.’ #aals”2 
INTRODUCTION 
In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal4 the 
Supreme Court heightened the requirements for adequately 
pleading a complaint in federal court, replacing lax notice pleading 
with more demanding plausibility pleading.5 The Court denied 
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Citron, Darrell Miller, and Jane Yakowitz, as well as participants in Brooklyn Law 
School’s workshop group, who provided thoughtful comments on this manuscript. My 
sincere gratitude also extends to the many people at Touro Law Center who helped me 
with this project, including Dean Patricia Salkin as well as previous Dean Larry Raful, 
who provided generous summer support. Also included in this group are April 
Schwartz and her library staff. Thanks also to my research assistants who helped on 
this project: Julia Capie, Danielle Koestner, Sergey Korolev, Jennifer Maldonado, 
Arsalan Ali Memon, Larry Przetakiewicz, and Megan Sterback. 
 1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2008) 
(No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 5168391[hereinafter Iqbal Transcript]. 
 2 Ira Nathenson, Comments on AALS Panel on 75th Anniversary of the 
FRCP, INFOGLUT.TUMBLR (Jan 5, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://infoglut.tumblr.com/post/
40037283307/comments-on-aals-panel-on-75th-anniversary-of-the (recording, via a 
tweet, Justice Scalia’s comment about Iqbal, made as a panel speaker during the 2013 
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools). 
 3 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 4 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-86; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 570. The Supreme 
Court’s new plausibility pleading standard measures whether a plaintiff has succeeded 
in meeting the “short and plain statement of the claim” requirement under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which is one of Rule 8(a)’s three requisites for stating a 
valid complaint in federal trial courts. The other two requirements are “a short and 
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1), and 
“a demand for the relief sought,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3). 
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that it was adopting a new, tougher pleading requirement,6 but it 
is difficult to take that denial seriously.7 This plausibility pleading 
revolution has deservedly garnered enormous attention.8 The 
                                                                                                             
 
  For purposes of convenience, I will use the word “Rule” or “Rules” to refer 
to one or more Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, when I refer to the 
“Advisory Committee” or “Standing Committee” I am referring to those pertaining to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 6 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70 & n.14. 
 7 See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1212-16 (9th Cir. 2011); Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate 
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 
518 (2010) (describing Twombly and Iqbal as having “dramatically heightened pleading 
standards”). See generally infra notes 110, 247. A prime piece of evidence supporting 
the heightened pleading interpretation is that the Court’s approaches in Twombly and 
Iqbal seem impossible to reconcile with the cursory forms in an appendix to the Rules 
that are supposed to serve as representative samples of adequate pleading. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity 
and brevity that these rules contemplate.”); FED. R. CIV. P. app. Form 11 (indicating that an 
allegation stating “[o]n date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff” suffices to satisfy FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 
U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002); see also Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and 
Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 861 (2010) 
[hereinafter Comment on Iqbal] (explaining that “it is difficult to see the difference between 
this negligence allegation [in Form 11] and the key allegations in Iqbal”); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 838 (2010) (“After Iqbal, then, a complaint hewing carefully to the standard 
reflected by the sample Forms should, in theory, succumb to a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.”). In his Twombly dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out the 
discrepancy between plausibility pleading and the Rule forms. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). No justice in the Twombly or Iqbal majorities 
addressed the discrepancy. 
  Currently, the dissonance between plausibility pleading and the Rule forms is 
potentially subject to “magical” resolution through an effort to abrogate the forms. See infra 
note 35; Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 
84, and the Forms, ___ NEV. L.J. (Seattle University School of Law Research Paper No. 14-
09, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375042; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, The 
Forms Had a Function, ___ NEV. L.J. (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper No, 2014-44, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472083. This is one part of 
an inadvisable post-hoc effort to conform the Rules to plausibility pleading. See infra notes 
34-36 and accompanying text.  
 8 For example, symposia dedicated to this revolution and its implications have 
been held at the Lewis & Clark Law School, the Penn State Law School, and New York 
Law School. See Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2010); 
Symposium, Reflections on Iqbal: Discerning Its Rule, Grappling with Its Implications, 
114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1143 (2010); Symposium, Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? 
Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment Discrimination, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 659 
(2012-2013). The topic was also examined by the Section on Civil Procedure, under the 
rubric The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice, at the 2009 Association of 
American Law Schools Annual Meeting, which resulted in the publication of several 
articles. See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Comparative Pleading]; Edward A. Hartnett, Taming 
Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); Schneider, supra note 7, at 518; 
Catherine T. Struve, Foreword: Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 421 (2010). 
Additionally, Duke University Law School held a related conference. Special Symposium 
Issue, 2010 Civil Litigation Review Conference, 60 DUKE L.J. 537 (2010). Its general focus 
was upon costs and delays in litigating in federal courts; unsurprisingly, parts of the 
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Court’s objective was to use pleading doctrine to increase early 
judicial discretion to dismiss cases,9 and thereby make it harder for 
plaintiffs to access discovery.10 This article adds a new critique to 
the discussion about the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading 
regime by focusing upon the Supreme Court’s crucial yet largely 
unexplored choice to prescribe a pleading solution for a perceived 
discovery problem.11 This critique has important implications for 
recent discovery reform proposals that the Advisory Committee 
and the Standing Committee have recently considered.12 
The Court imposed plausibility pleading principally 
because it was concerned about perceived problems with 
discovery.13 Discovery grants an individual party the discretion to 
compel disclosure in a powerful and dangerous way because the 
costs for requesting discovery are low but are usually coupled 
                                                                                                             
 
conference considered pleading doctrine—including Twombly and Iqbal—as well as 
discovery. See John G. Koeltl, Introduction: Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 
537, 540-44 (2010). 
 9 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009) [hereinafter Regulation of Court Access] 
(describing Twombly as “elevat[ing] case screening to an important pleading function 
in sharp contrast to notice pleading’s exclusive focus on giving notice”). 
 10 See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Numerous commentators 
have recognized that the Twombly and Iqbal majorities were powerfully animated by 
hostility to discovery and the burdens it can impose. See, e.g., Bone, Regulation of 
Court Access, supra note 9, at 884, 919-20; Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 69 (2010) [hereinafter New Discovery]; Robin J. Effron, The 
Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and 
Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2023, 2025-26 (2010); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front 
Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental 
Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 107 (2010); 
Schneider, supra note 7, at 524. 
 11 The perception that discovery is problematic is undeniably widespread. See, 
e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 2 (2009) [hereinafter ACTL/IAALS, 
FINAL REPORT] (reporting on 2008 litigation survey of American College of Trial Lawyers 
fellows, which found perception that “discovery can cost far too much and can become 
an end in itself”). However, the evidence points to a more nuanced reality, in which 
discovery may be problematic only in a small minority of cases. See infra notes 83-85 
and accompanying text. To the extent that discovery is problematic, Professor Kessler 
persuasively pins the blame upon our merger of law and equity power. Amalia D. 
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for 
an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1251-54 (2005) (arguing 
that merger of equity and law courts has given parties powerful procedural devices, 
including broad discovery options, that used to exist only in equity—wholly subject to 
judicial control—which has given parties power to abuse those procedures and 
subsume courts’ justice and truth-seeking function in favor of procedural dominance); 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (abolishing distinction between equity and law in favor of “one 
form of action—the civil action”). 
 12 See infra note 34; see supra note 5 for an explanation of my use of the 
phrases “Advisory Committee” and “Standing Committee.” 
 13 See supra note 10. 
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with a unilateral ability to impose sometimes high costs upon an 
opponent.14 Though the Rules15 offer the economizing option of 
simply opening one’s files to the party seeking discovery,16 this 
option is illusory for at least two reasons. First, the responding 
party has an obligation to do some significant work in at least 
selecting and parsing the portions of records that are likely to be 
responsive, rather than imposing upon the requesting party the 
burden of wading through quantities of unresponsive documents.17 
Second, at least in cases involving voluminous documents, the 
option of allowing inspection rather than producing documents is 
more theoretical than real given the need to know what 
information has been revealed to an adversary. Even if the costs of 
responding to discovery can be reduced, such as through the 
relatively new Federal Rule of Evidence 50218 or the use of 
computer automation, the demand for informational transparency 
through discovery will always be subject to the procedural 
critique that it is too unfettered. For example, it is not subject to 
the majoritarian check that applies to compelled disclosure in 
congressional or regulatory inquiries.19 
It is undoubtedly true that Twombly and Iqbal were 
motivated by concerns broader than discovery.20 Generally 
 
 14 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 80 (“[S]erving discovery usually 
is far less expensive than responding to discovery.”). 
 15 See supra note 5 for an explanation of my use of the word “Rule” or “Rules.” 
 16 Technically, the Rules authorize a responding party to merely grant access to 
business records (as opposed to actually producing a set of those business records for the 
requesting party) only when responding to interrogatories. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d). Yet it is 
widely accepted that simply granting an opportunity to inspect records is an option in 
response to requests for document production under FED. R. CIV. P. 34. See, e.g., 7 JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 34.13[2][a] (3d ed. 2012); 8B CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2213 (3d ed. 2010). 
 17 See Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 455 (7th Cir. 1997); Hagemeyer N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 598 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Wagner v. Dryvit 
Systems, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 610 (D. Neb. 2001); Stiller v. Arnold, 167 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. 
Ind. 1996); Montania v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 153 F.R.D. 620, 621 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Colorado 
ex rel. Woodward v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr. Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1985). 
 18 Rule 502, which protects against inadvertent waiver of attorney-client 
privilege and work product protection during litigation, was enacted in 2008. Act of 
Sept. 19, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537. 
 19 See generally 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2012) (establishing penalties for failure to comply 
with congressional directive to appear as witness or produce records); Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1959) (implying congressional investigatory power as incident 
of Article I legislative function); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955) 
(holding that either house of Congress, or a congressional committee appointed by Congress, 
has authority to conduct investigations); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) 
(establishing applicable guidelines when Congress wishes to hold an individual in contempt 
for refusing to comply with congressional subpoena). 
 20 See Schneider, supra note 7, at 519 (opining that decisions were motivated by 
a more generalized hostility to litigation and a desire to limit the judicial role, at least in 
certain types of disfavored cases). 
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speaking, these cases were concerned about waste and abuse. 
The waste and abuse that Twombly and Iqbal targeted are 
often connected to discovery but also exist independent of it, 
and are largely (though not wholly) related to party fairness. 
Two concerns are about the parties’ financial and non-financial 
resources. Twombly stated that “when the allegations in a 
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to 
relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of 
minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties . . . .”21 
Twombly was primarily focused upon defendant fairness, as it 
exemplified when it referred to the need to apply “financial and 
human capital to hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and 
otherwise fend off allegations of conspiracy.”22 These concerns 
about the parties’ financial and non-financial resources not only 
can be, but many times certainly are, related to discovery, which 
imposes financial and non-financial costs.23 But these costs can be, 
and often are, totally independent of discovery, such as the time 
and effort to locate and hire an attorney, cooperate with the 
attorney, and engage in non-discovery motion practice. 
The choice Twombly and Iqbal made to apply a pleading 
solution to problems of waste and abuse is justifiable to a certain 
extent because pleading doctrine can address both of these 
concerns, and can do so extremely effectively. The problem is that 
it cannot do so carefully, in a manner that avoids sacrificing other 
important and competing objectives. The question that Twombly 
and Iqbal raise is whether that sacrifice is worth it. Most of the 
scholarship about Twombly and Iqbal answers that it is not. 
This is especially so where the concerns about waste 
and abuse are primarily centered around discovery. And there 
is no doubt that, although some non-discovery concerns 
motivated Twombly and Iqbal, discovery was a prime motivating 
factor behind plausibility pleading, as Justice Scalia has since 
acknowledged in comments to law professors.24 Twombly 
highlighted the link to discovery when it stated that “[a]sking 
for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a 
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls 
for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”25 It again 
 
 21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 22 Id. at 567 n.12. 
 23 See infra text accompanying note 149. 
 24 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also supra note 10.  
 25 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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signaled its concern about discovery when it warned that 
“before proceeding to discovery, a complaint must allege facts 
suggestive of illegal conduct.”26 Iqbal rang a similar bell about 
discovery when it noted that “Rule 8 marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading 
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery 
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”27 
Iqbal’s use of gatekeeping language with respect to discovery was 
no accident and emphasizes the pleading-discovery nexus the 
Court was leveraging. 
Twombly and Iqbal are difficult to justify because of the 
catalyzing role that discovery played in them. Insufficient 
attention has been paid to whether the pleading remedy Twombly 
and Iqbal chose to apply was well suited to their overarching 
concerns about discovery. Viewing Twombly and Iqbal through a 
lens that accounts for discovery’s purposeful role in our litigation 
system provides further reason for criticizing those opinions. The 
litigation system established under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was premised upon low pleading standards and broad 
discovery in the hope that this would increase dispositions 
reflective of the true merits of cases rather than upon 
technicalities. Such justice comes at a cost, but the Rule drafters 
believed that the costs attendant to a low pleading threshold for 
accessing the courts, coupled with liberal discovery, were 
worthwhile. The Twombly and Iqbal Courts did not. In choosing 
to address discovery concerns through pleading, the Court 
embraced the overlap between pleading and discovery. This 
choice is understandable to the extent that a relationship exists 
between pleading and discovery. More detailed pleading would be 
expected to narrow the issues for trial and correspondingly during 
discovery.28 Additionally, lax pleading can be used hand-in-hand 
with discovery for illegitimate purposes.29 However, the Court 
ignored that there is an insufficient correlation between pleading 
and discovery to accomplish its goals without unduly sacrificing 
court access, including its twin objectives of procedural and 
substantive justice. 
This has resulted in several important consequences. 
First, it calls into question whether the Court has the authority, 
 
 26 Id. at 563 n.8. 
 27 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). 
 28 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 644-45 
(1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse]. 
 29 See Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making 
It the Norm, Rather Than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 519 (2010). 
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expertise, and institutional competence to change the pleading 
standard in the absence of any change to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2).30 By invoking raw judicial power to change 
pleading standards for every civil case filed in the federal 
district courts, motivated in large measure by antipathy to 
discovery, the Supreme Court has indulged in an analytical 
muddle. The Court has created uncertainty for litigants and 
federal judges31 and has bypassed the rulemaking process under 
the Rules Enabling Act,32 which is better suited to considering 
what discovery reforms, if any, should be implemented.33 As a 
result, the Court has improperly aggrandized its own power, and 
for questionable ends. Second, it has destabilized the entire 
procedural structure in federal district courts because the 
simplified pleading system the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
adopted was holistically linked to other parts of the Rules’ 
structure. Third, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure has responded by seeking to reform the rules 
in a manner that seemingly brings them into accord with 
plausibility pleading, as evidenced by proposals to tighten and 
reduce discovery and to eliminate the form complaints that 
evidenced the original simplified pleading requirements that the 
rules inaugurated in 1938. The Advisory Committee withdrew 
several of the more aggressive discovery limitations.34 Both the 
 
 30 See infra note 33. 
 31 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 823, 844-46. 
 32 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a)-(b) (2012) (authorizing Supreme Court to “prescribe” 
federal rules, but prohibiting ones that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). 
 33 Numerous commentators have questioned the procedural legitimacy of 
Twombly and Iqbal given that they reformed pleading doctrine outside the Rules 
Enabling Act process and in the absence of legislative directive. See, e.g., Bone, Comment 
on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 883-85; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 849-50; Helen 
Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The Views of Two Co-
authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28-29 (2009); see also Effron, supra note 10, at 2026-27; 
see infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 34 In August 2013, the Advisory Committee proposed to: reduce the 
presumptive number of allowed depositions per side to five (from ten); shorten each 
deposition’s presumptive allowed length to six hours (from seven); limit the presumptive 
number of allowed interrogatories to 15 (from 25); and inaugurate a presumptive limit on 
requests to admit (pegged at 25). Danielle Dellerson, Proposed Changes to Discovery, ESI 
Rules Top Civil Rule Proposals Out for Comment, 82 U.S.L.W. 276, 276 (2013); Jeffrey D. 
Koelemay, Draft Discovery Rules May Create Injustice, Democrats Say at Subcommittee 
Hearing, 82 U.S.L.W. 715, 715 (2013). It withdrew these proposals after “encountering 
‘fierce resistance.’” Tera E. Brostoff & Jeffrey D. Koelemay, Draft E-Discovery Rule Gets 
Another Revision; Is Process Too Slow For Pace of Technology?, 82 U.S.L.W. 1501, 1503 
(2014) (quoting Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure 4 (June 14, 2014), in SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. B-4 
(Sept. 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Reports/ST09-2014.pdf). 
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Standing Committee and then the Judicial Conference approved 
what remained, as well as Rule amendments that are more 
nuanced but that have the potential to significantly change 
discovery, which will become law unless the Supreme Court or 
Congress intervenes.35 This course of action can be justified as a 
reasonable response to Twombly and Iqbal, but whether it is 
advisable depends upon Twombly’s and Iqbal’s legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, Twombly and Iqbal were bad rulings for numerous 
reasons. The misguided choice they made to use pleading doctrine 
to address discovery concerns has serious repercussions for the 
business of our federal courts—rights enforcement—and the 
people, organizations, and governmental entities that turn to those 
courts for the resolution of disputes. The repercussions are 
important because “[i]n a society that relies heavily on the courts 
for rights vindication and social reform, the distribution of 
litigating power is vital to the distribution of social and political 
power.”36 Thus, rather than revising the Rules’ structure to 
conform to those inadvisable rulings, reformers would do better to 
use the legislative process to amend the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in a manner that limits damage from Twombly and 
Iqbal. One avenue would be to reform the discovery rules 
themselves, but in fairer and more even-handed ways than are 
currently being pursued. 
Part I of this article will explain why plausibility pleading 
is poorly matched to resolving any discovery problems that might 
exist. Part II will make the case that a better solution is to reform 
 
 35 These include: abrogating Rule 84 and the appendix of forms that have 
exemplified the simplified pleading that the rule drafters intended to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2); 
expressly adopting proportional discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) and referencing it as a discovery 
limitation in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); eliminating the possibility of a good cause expansion of 
discovery to what is relevant to the subject matter; deleting the definitional statement in 
Rule 26(b)(1) pertaining to discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” which 
specifies that it includes the existence, description, and location of documents and witnesses; 
deleting Rule 26(b)(1)’s explanatory phrase that discovery “reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence” is proper and replacing it with what appears to be a 
substantively narrower statement that discovery “need not be admissible in evidence to be 
discoverable”; in Rule 26(c)(1)(B) expressly allowing discovery cost-shifting in protective 
orders; and greatly expanding the Rule 37(e) e-discovery safe harbor for failure to preserve 
electronically stored information as compared to both the Rule’s previous iteration and 
several, often influential, lower court interpretations. Tera E. Brostoff & Jeffrey D. 
Koelemay, E-Discovery Rule Gets Late-Night Rewrite, Advisory Committee Approves Rule 
Package, 82 U.S.L.W. 1549, 1551 (2014); Kimberly Robinson, ‘Significant’ Changes to 
Federal Civil Rules, Including E-Discovery, Pass Judicial Muster, 83 U.S.L.W. 444, 445 
(2014); Koelemay, supra note 34. The United States Supreme Court has approved these 
changes and submitted them to Congress. Order of the United States Supreme Court (Apr. 
29, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. At this 
point only Congress can prevent these amendments from becoming law. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2072(a), 2074. 
 36 Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 875. 
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discovery instead of pleading doctrine. Finally, Part III will 
survey numerous options for reforming discovery. 
I. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING AS AN IMPROPER SOLUTION TO A 
“DISCOVERY PROBLEM” 
To understand how the Supreme Court so badly went 
astray in Twombly and Iqbal, it is helpful to initially focus upon 
the Court’s views about discovery rather than the pleading issues 
or any other legalities involved in the two cases. Just as motive is 
so often crucial to solving a crime, discovery is crucial to 
understanding how we have reached this point because it is what 
principally motivated the Court in these two decisions. 
The Court majorities in Twombly and Iqbal have a very 
particular, disfavorable view of discovery, but all indications are 
that they do not fully appreciate the realities of discovery in 
practice or its doctrinal or theoretical complexities. With regard to 
the realities, they greatly exaggerate the problems with discovery 
and treat the small subset of cases in which discovery is 
problematic as if it they are representative of the whole. As for 
doctrine and theory, they ignore that pleading and discovery are 
holistically linked to each other as well as other provisions in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that changing pleading 
doctrine but nothing else will therefore have a destabilizing effect. 
Because discovery is problematic in a small percentage of cases, 
Twombly and Iqbal fail to appreciate that applying a pleading 
solution to all cases is unfairly overinclusive. Twombly and Iqbal 
also seriously erred by focusing only upon defendant fairness in 
discovery, while ignoring plaintiff fairness, and thus they are also 
unfairly underinclusive. Finally, they evinced such an exaggerated 
concern for defendant fairness in discovery as to have blurred the 
lines between anti-suit protections in general civil litigation as 
compared to cases involving qualified immunity defenses. 
A. The Easterbrook Canard 
With regard to the Supreme Court’s practical 
understanding of discovery, Twombly relied upon and quoted 
extensively from Judge Easterbrook’s well-known critique of 
discovery,37 as I will detail below.38 Iqbal similarly emphasized its 
distrust of limited discovery when it stated that “the question 
 
 37 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559-60 & n.6 (2007) (quoting 
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, supra note 28). 
 38 See infra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
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presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient 
pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery 
process,”39 and again when it derided staggered discovery because 
even defendants temporarily protected from discovery would still 
be burdened by needing to monitor and hence participate in it.40 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of Judge Easterbrook’s critique, and 
its corresponding hostility to discovery, is misplaced, particularly 
as a justification for imposing plausibility pleading. On close 
examination, Judge Easterbrook’s critique is overblown at best, 
and is often just plain wrong, especially as applied to the run of 
cases. To the extent his position is defensible, it is most likely in 
large, complex cases. This admittedly helps justify the Twombly 
majority’s reliance on it, as the large antitrust case at issue there 
was of a type most susceptible to Judge Easterbrook’s critique. 
But Iqbal emphasized that plausibility pleading now applies to all 
federal district court cases41—not just large, complex ones—and 
the resulting carryover of Judge Easterbrook’s discovery critique 
is thus both unjustifiable and unfortunate. 
The Twombly majority was so influenced by Judge 
Easterbrook’s account that it extensively quoted him in rejecting 
the ameliorative prospect of judicial supervision of discovery. 
The timing is all wrong. The plaintiff files a sketchy complaint (the 
Rules of Civil Procedure discourage fulsome documents), and 
discovery is launched. A judicial officer does not know the details of 
the case the parties will present and in theory cannot know the 
details. Discovery is used to find the details. The judicial officer 
always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves may 
not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find. 
A magistrate supervising discovery does not—cannot—know the 
expected productivity of a given request, because the nature of the 
requester’s claim and the contents of the files (or head) of the 
adverse party are unknown. Judicial officers cannot measure the 
costs and benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional 
requests. Requesters have no reason to disclose their own estimates 
because they gain from imposing costs on rivals (and may lose from 
an improvement in accuracy). The portions of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure calling on judges to trim back excessive demands, 
therefore, have been, and are doomed to be, hollow. We cannot 
prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot 
define; we cannot define “abusive” discovery except in theory, 
because in practice we lack essential information.42 
 
 39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2009). 
 40 See infra text accompanying note 106. 
 41 See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 42 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (quoting Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 
supra note 28, at 638-39) (citation omitted). 
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Though not quoted by the Twombly majority, Judge Easterbrook 
had continued: 
Even in retrospect it is hard to label requests as abusive. How can a 
judge distinguish a dry hole . . . from a request that was not justified 
at the time? Ex post perspectives are no answer to problems that 
must be solved ex ante. . . . [Magistrates] have no way to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of discovery ex ante, and they rarely examine 
their handiwork ex post (because the case either settles or passes to 
the judge for disposition).43 
Twombly badly erred in crediting Judge Easterbrook’s 
hyperbolic discovery critique. Consider the “sketchy complaint.”44 
Complaints do not get much “sketchier” than the form complaints 
appended to the Rules, such as the negligence complaint in Form 
11 for a collision between a person and an automobile.45 Taking 
Judge Easterbrook at his word would leave one believing that there 
is no reliable way, ex ante or ex post, to assess the reasonableness 
of discovery in such a case. But that is clearly untrue. Even with 
the dearth of facts in such a complaint, both the parties and the 
judge have ample bases upon which to gauge whether discovery 
requests are reasonable or not. These actors know that numerous 
areas of inquiry are likely to be proper, such as inquiries into 
eyesight, what each person was doing at the time of the alleged 
collision, whether the automobile was in proper repair, etc. All 
have sufficient information to have a sense that some types of 
information may or may not be proper. For example, whether 
plaintiff ’s medical history should be discoverable will depend 
upon the extent to which it is related to the alleged injuries. 
Further, Judge Easterbrook’s lament that “[a] judicial 
officer does not know the details of the case” is often untrue. It 
is most often true in the case of the “sketchy complaint” Judge 
Easterbrook mentions. But sketchy complaints are most likely 
used in simple cases—usually pro se cases—where details of the 
case are not usually necessary to have a sense of what discovery is 
proper and improper. The vast majority of complaints are not 
“sketchy” but instead go above and beyond Rule 8(a)(2)’s minimal 
requirements. This is the difference between the art and craft of 
legal practice and its prevailing standards versus Rule 8(a)(2)’s 
technically minimal pleading requirements. The complaints in 
large, complex cases, such as Twombly, are invariably rife with 
 
 43 Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, supra note 28, at 639. 
 44 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 45 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. Form 11 may soon be a historical relic. See 
supra note 35. 
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factual detail. The Twombly complaint was 29 pages long, with 
96 numbered paragraphs.46 The Iqbal complaint was 54 pages 
long, with 270 numbered paragraphs.47 These complaints were 
certainly not “sketchy.” They undeniably provided adequate 
notice to the defendants and judge of the factual bases of the 
suits and the legal bases upon which liability was alleged. They 
were not so bereft of detail that the parties and judges in the 
cases would be left meandering about aimlessly, with little to no 
understanding of what the case was about, how to respond and 
defend, or as to the scope of discovery. Contrary to what Twombly’s 
and Iqbal’s rhetoric suggested, the “judicial officer[s]” presiding 
over the cases would not have been hamstrung by “not know[ing] 
the details of the case” in a manner that would leave the officers 
clueless about how to oversee discovery. Twombly was simply 
wrong in suggesting the contrary when it endorsed Judge 
Easterbrook’s critique. 
After all, if Judge Easterbrook, and in turn Twombly and 
Iqbal, were correct about the futility of judicial oversight over 
discovery because its scope and limitations are too uncertain or 
essentially unknowable, spoliation sanctions would rarely if ever 
be issued because parties could not be held to poorly defined or 
unknowable discovery obligations that judges could not identify.48 
But that is clearly not the case. Litigation and discovery come 
with an obligation to preserve evidence. That obligation is 
enforced through spoliation doctrine. “Spoliation refers to the 
destruction or material alteration of evidence or to the failure to 
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or 
reasonably foreseeable litigation” and is sanctionable.49 Contrary 
to what Judge Easterbrook’s critique suggests, the scope of 
discovery is sufficiently knowable that spoliation sanctions are 
regularly granted. That the duty to preserve evidence exists even 
 
 46 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic 
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-CIV-10220), 2003 WL 25629874, 
vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 47 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 
04-CIV-01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), 2004 WL 3756442, rev’d 
sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 48 Recall that Judge Easterbrook’s critique, with which Twombly was so taken, 
was not only that the presiding judicial officer could not know enough to recognize discovery 
limitations, but that even the parties might not know. See supra text accompanying note 42 
(“The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves may 
not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find.”). 
 49 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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before litigation has commenced further undermines the critique 
that discovery obligations are too amorphous.50 
The “problem” to which the Supreme Court was 
responding in Twombly and Iqbal was decidedly not “sketchy” 
complaints, or the lack of sufficient notice about the claims 
asserted or their factual nature. The problem was discovery and, 
to be more precise, discovery burdens in general as well as the 
more specific concern about unilateral imposition of asymmetric 
discovery burdens. Had “sketchy” complaints been the real 
problem, a pleading doctrine solution would have been fitting. But 
where the perceived problem was discovery, the Court made a 
poor choice in responding with a pleading prescription. It would 
have done better to pursue a more appropriate remedy—
reforming discovery itself.51 
B. Destabilizing 
Though the discovery concerns that so motivated Twombly 
and Iqbal may have some merit in a small minority of cases,52 
Twombly and Iqbal have “destabilized the entire system of civil 
litigation”53 in federal court by revising pleading doctrine without 
adequately addressing the impact in light of the other Rules. The 
Rules—for sound systematic reasons—operate from a presumption 
that favors disclosure.54 The Rules seek to promote dispute 
resolution on the merits,55 and sharing information is central to 
that goal.56 The party seeking disclosure need only overcome the 
 
 50 Id. at 591 (“The duty to preserve material evidence arises not only during 
litigation but also extends to that period before the litigation when a party reasonably 
should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.”). 
 51 See infra Part III. 
 52 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 53 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 823. 
 54 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238-39 (1989); see also id. at 
2239 (“[I]n operation the system is one of mandatory response rather than focused 
inquest . . . .”); id. at 2241 (referring to “[t]he open disclosure ethos of the Federal Rules”); 
Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 514, 517, 520; id. at 527 (arguing that, though Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) already includes proportionality factors to apply to discovery disputes, “in 
practice the guidelines are rarely used. Instead, proportionality takes a back seat to the 
strong presumption in favor of broad and liberal discovery.”). This ethos of liberal discovery 
is unique in the world. See Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and 
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (“[N]o other country in the world has any system of 
discovery approaching that provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 55 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962); Robert G. Bone, Improving 
Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 289-90, 293 (2010) 
[hereinafter Improving Rule 1]; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986). 
 56 See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The theory of the 
federal rules is that once notice-giving pleadings have been served, the parties are to 
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minor obstacles of relevancy and nonprivilege to establish a 
presumptive entitlement to information,57 and sometimes need 
not do even that, as some information is subject to initial 
disclosure without even a request for information or an initial 
showing of relevancy and nonprivilege.58 The Rules place on the 
holder of information the burden of showing some reason to 
escape disclosure,59 even to the extent of placing upon that party 
the burden of asserting irrelevancy or privilege objections.60 
The change to plausibility pleading, without altering 
discovery, is destabilizing because it ignores the holistic 
symbiosis between pleading and discovery that the Rule drafters 
both pursued and achieved.61 Rule 8(a)(2), implemented with the 
adoption of the Rules in 1938 (an effort that law school Dean 
Charles Clark spearheaded),62 abandoned the preceding heightened 
pleading standards of common law writ pleading, the Field Code, 
and fact pleading in favor of simplified pleading that came over 
time to be equated with notice pleading.63 It did so precisely 
                                                                                                             
 
conduct discovery in order to learn more about the underlying facts. When they have 
learned the facts, the parties can settle or seek judgment.”); Charles E. Clark, The New 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied in 
Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937) [hereinafter 
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]; Marcus, supra note 55, at 439-40; Netzorg & Kern, 
supra note 29, at 514; Schneider, supra note 7, at 523-24; see also Stephen N. Subrin, The 
Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” 
Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 396-97 (2010) [hereinafter Adjusting “One Size Fits 
All”] (making the wider point that, in the United States, private litigation is central to 
enforcing law, and discovery is crucial to effectiveness of private litigation). To achieve the 
goal of informational transparency necessary to resolution on the merits, the Rules 
revolutionized discovery, which previously had been “severely limited.” Stephen N. Subrin, 
Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery 
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998) [hereinafter History of Federal Discovery Rules]; see 
also id. at 694-710, 717-29. The Rules’ liberalization of discovery was successful. “By the end 
of the first decade after the Federal Rules became law, many courts were routinely giving 
the discovery provisions the full scope the drafters had intended.” Id. at 738. 
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Soon this party may also have to overcome a 
proportionality obstacle. See supra note 35. 
 58 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), (2). 
 59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) & (c); see also Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 517. 
 60 See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 519-20. Soon objectors may have a new 
quiver in their arrow: an expressly recognized proportionality objection. See supra note 35. 
 61 Efforts are currently underway to alter discovery, but in an inadvisable 
way by simply limiting it across the board. See supra note 35; see infra Part III.A.1. 
 62 See Marcus, supra note 55, at 433; Subrin, History of Federal Discovery 
Rules, supra note 56, at 710. 
 63 See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of 
Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
80 (1989) [hereinafter Mapping Dispute Boundaries]; Dodson, Comparative Pleading, 
supra note 8, at 448; Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
551, 556 (2002); Marcus, supra note 55, at 433. See generally Subrin, History of Federal 
Discovery Rules, supra note 56, at 692-94 (briefly recounting history that led to passage 
of the Rules Enabling Act, which authorized the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 
2015] DISCOVERYMANIA 1501 
 
because experience under the earlier, more demanding pleading 
systems showed an inadequate correlation between pleading and 
a case’s underlying merits.64 “[T]he rulemakers felt that” those 
earlier systems “asked too much of the pleading stage, which 
consequently had become the center of legal attention, ended up 
mired down in battles over technicalities, and provided a vehicle 
for monumental abuse.”65 Thus, Clark concluded over 70 years 
ago that “[e]xperience has shown . . . that we cannot expect the 
proof of the case to be made through the pleadings, and that such 
proof is really not their function.”66 Though modern scholarship 
                                                                                                             
 
  There is disagreement about whether Rule 8(a)(2) implemented notice 
pleading. See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 892-93 & n.102; Clermont 
& Yeazell, supra note 7, at 824 n.6. The better view is that Rule 8(a)(2) came to be 
identified with notice pleading as a result of Clark’s judicial efforts after ascending to the 
U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and in particular to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Bone, Regulation of 
Court Access, supra note 9, at 893; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 824 n.6. Clark 
himself denied that the Federal Rules called for notice pleading. Charles E. Clark, Special 
Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 49-50 (1957); Charles E. Clark, Simplified 
Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 278 (1942) [hereinafter Clark, Simplified Pleading]; 
Charles E. Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEX. L. REV. 4, 
12 (1941) [hereinafter Clark, Texas and Federal Rules]. He preferred a system in which 
“illustrative forms” were used to “give specific content to” rules. Clark, Simplified 
Pleading at 278; Clark, Texas and Federal Rules at 12 n.24; see also supra note 7 (citing 
Rule 84 and Civil Form 11 and providing relevant language). 
  Determining precisely how much more factual detail Clark desired above and 
beyond the full laxity of formal notice pleading is challenging. See Hartnett, supra note 8, 
at 493-94 & nn.99-103. Professors Clermont and Yeazell seem to have aptly summed up 
the evidence when they conclude that “[w]hether or not Judge Clark favored ‘notice 
pleading,’ he certainly supported simple pleading.” Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 
825 n.11; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 877 (2008) (explaining how the rule drafters 
declined to require a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish a cause of action); 
Subrin, History of Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 56, at 711 n.133. 
 64 See Clark, New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 56, at 977; 
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 824-25; see, e.g., Ross v. Mather, 51 N.Y. 108 (1872) 
(holding that, under code pleading, complaint pleading fraud lacked merit despite 
plaintiff having proved breach of contract); Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 
762, 765-66 (N.C. 1963) (affirming, under code pleading, dismissal of complaint that 
clearly asserted a trespass claim because plaintiff failed to allege underlying facts). This 
weakness in the pleading-merits link strongly influenced Clark and other Rule drafters. 
It is true that Charles Clark eschewed case screening at the pleading stage 
and that the drafters contemplated decisions on the basis of evidence rather 
than allegations . . . . They thought a procedural system with these elements 
would work much better than the common law and code systems they 
inherited. “Work much better” meant that the procedural system would 
enforce the substantive law more effectively . . . . 
Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 895 (citations omitted); see also id. 
n.116 and accompanying text. 
 65 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 824; see also Bone, Comment on Iqbal, 
supra note 7, at 862-67. 
 66 Clark, New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 56, at 977. 
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makes the same point,67 nonetheless Twombly and Iqbal—
whether properly interpreted as imposing a type of fact 
pleading,68 or an entirely “novel” pleading doctrine69—essentially 
force us back to a time of heightened pleading requirements,70 
with no justifiable sense that a better outcome will ensue.71 
Despite these historical lessons, the Supreme Court has 
introduced plausibility pleading without any corresponding change 
to the holistically connected discovery rules.72 Consequently, the 
heightened plausibility pleading regime has created an aggressive 
pre-discovery dismissal regime in the absence of any mechanism 
for assessing whether at least limited discovery is merited prior 
to a dismissal. Though discovery is strictly limited in civil law 
inquisitorial systems, at least there the inquisitorial judge fulfills 
the function of assessing whether some discovery is merited prior 
to an early dismissal,73 which helps justify the more stringent 
pleading regimes in those systems. By contrast, those plaintiffs 
that Twombly and Iqbal newly disadvantage not only find 
themselves inhibited from succeeding in our adversarial system, 
but now also find themselves actually worse off than if they had 
litigated in an inquisitorial system despite that in such systems 
party control over discovery is minimal or non-existent. In an 
 
 67 See infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
 68 A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Understanding Pleading Doctrine]; But see Kevin M. Clermont, 
Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1340-59 (2010) 
(distinguishing plausibility pleading from fact pleading). 
 69 Professors Clermont and Yeazell perceive Twombly and Iqbal as having 
created an entirely new pleading regime. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 832-34 
(explaining that plausibility pleading creates a “test not for factual detail, but for factual 
convincingness,” and requires a “judge to weigh likelihood without any evidential basis 
and with scant procedural protections, effectively creating a civil procedure hitherto 
foreign to our fundamental procedural principles, at least in the absence of emergency”). I 
think they are correct. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 486; Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & 
Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and 
Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 149 (2009), http://www.pennlawreview.com/
debates/index.php?id=24. 
 71 See Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 869; Arthur R. Miller, From 
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1, 22-23, 29-30 (2010) (arguing that plausibility pleading invites subjective 
judgments, invades jury’s role, and could improperly limit access to justice). 
 72 As I discuss in more detail above and below, the Advisory Committee is on 
a campaign to reform discovery, though unfortunately to limit discovery rather than by 
promoting better tailored discovery. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text; see 
infra Part III.A.1. 
 73 See Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in 
Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 690 (2006); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing 
Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem 
and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 971 (2004). 
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inquisitorial system, these plaintiffs could have hoped that the 
presiding magistrate would oversee at least limited fact-finding,74 
which often serves in the stead of the party-controlled discovery 
model of our adversarial system. Thus, after Twombly and Iqbal, 
many plaintiffs will be deprived of the adversarial discovery that 
is an integral part of our Rules system, and moreover will be 
worse off than if they had litigated in an inquisitorial system, 
where they would lack control over discovery but at least have 
the possibility of an investigative process that could uncover the 
facts necessary to their case. These plaintiffs quite literally find 
themselves in the worst of both worlds: deprived of an 
opportunity to succeed in our adversarial system, while also 
being deprived of access to inquisitorial power that may have 
allowed them to prevail. 
It is likely that one animating factor for the Twombly and 
Iqbal majorities was the transsubstantive nature of the Rules,75 
which has become a great disadvantage when discovery is at issue, 
particularly given that discovery concerns seem concentrated in a 
small number of complex cases.76 The transsubstantive discovery 
Rules are so powerful that they can usually compel disclosure, 
subject to limited exceptions such as privileges,77 protected work 
product,78 when some intellectual property rights such as “trade 
secret[s]” or “commercial information” are at issue,79 or in rare 
instances when specific statutory limitations exist.80 This, 
combined with the often cost-free ability to impose discovery costs 
upon an opponent, is a great weakness in our discovery regime 
because it creates a dynamic ripe for manipulation and gaming. 
Many academics have argued forcefully against transsubstantive 
 
 74 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991); Pearce, supra 
note 73, at 978. 
 75 See Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 290-92 (reviewing origins of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and explaining that they were meant to be transsubstantive). 
 76 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 77 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (making only “nonprivileged” information discoverable). 
 78 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 79 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G). 
 80 One such example can be seen in the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701-11 (2013), which protects electronic communications and transactional records and 
regulates government access to customer records and contents stored on electronic 
databases. The SCA has been interpreted as providing an exemption from litigation 
discovery. See Opinion and Order at 2, Fontenot v. Brouillette, No. H-10-1053 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 9, 2012) (quashing subpoena to email provider after ruling that SCA § 2702 prohibits 
such providers from disclosing customers’ communications absent an SCA exception, and 
determining that the SCA contains no exception for civil discovery); see also J.T. Shannon 
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Gilco Lumber, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-119, 2008 WL 3833216, at *1 (N.D. 
Miss. Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that SCA “prohibits a person or entity that provides an 
electronic communication service to the public from knowingly divulging the contents of any 
communication that is carried or maintained on the system”). 
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pleading,81 and one would expect the case to be only more powerful 
against a discovery regime that is largely applied in a similar 
manner—consistent with the liberal discovery “ethos” inherent in 
the Rules82—across the broad swathe of cases. But by taking aim at 
pleading rather than discovery, the Twombly and Iqbal Courts 
destabilized the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an outcome they 
accomplished by engaging in misdirection and short-circuiting the 
debate that was at the core of their concern: the legitimacy of our 
discovery regime and whether it should be reformed. 
C. Unfairly Overinclusive 
In addition to being destabilizing, the transsubstantive 
nature of the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading 
standard, which reforms pleading doctrine while changing 
nothing else in the Rules system, is unfairly overbroad, for at 
least two reasons. First, plausibility pleading affects all 
plaintiffs. Its impact is not limited to the small amount of 
litigation in which discovery is likely to be problematic. Second, 
Twombly and Iqbal ignore the huge impact that plausibility 
pleading will have in the many classes of cases that are marked 
by information asymmetry. 
Empirical evidence suggests that, to the extent Twombly 
and Iqbal adopted plausibility pleading as a solution to a 
perceived discovery problem, they were staggeringly overbroad. 
To the extent that discovery is problematic, this appears to be 
true only in a small proportion of federal litigation, most 
particularly in complex litigation.83 As Professor Subrin has 
explained, “discovery is overwhelming” in only a minority of cases, 
though these constitute “a substantial number” and “it is those 
cases that tend to occupy a good deal of the attention of federal 
judges and the press.”84 It is this disproportionate attention that 
moved the Court in Twombly and Iqbal, but led it astray. Though 
the Court applied plausibility pleading to all plaintiffs in all cases, 
 
 81 E.g., Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 936; Stephen B. 
Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713-18 (1988); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be 
Dismissed?: The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008); Subrin, Adjusting “One Size Fits All,” supra note 56, at 377 & 
n.1; see also Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 288, 300-01 (arguing against 
transsubstantive procedural rules that allow tailoring but through insufficiently 
constrained judicial discretion). 
 82 Hazard, supra note 54, at 2241. 
 83 See Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, supra note 28, at 646; Kessler, supra 
note 11, at 1189. 
 84 Subrin, Adjusting “One Size Fits All,” supra note 56, at 392-93. 
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in significant part to address a perceived discovery problem, the 
Court ignored the evidence, which indicates that discovery and its 
costs are problematic in only a small minority of cases.85 
Twombly and Iqbal can also be faulted for ignoring that 
changing the pleading standard as a response to discovery 
concerns creates problems, particularly in common types of 
litigation in which informational asymmetry between the parties 
is a hallmark.86 Information asymmetry exists anytime the 
defending party’s state of mind is material, as is the case in many 
civil rights cases, such as in employment discrimination litigation, 
and in many intentional torts.87 Information asymmetry is also a 
hallmark of other types of litigation such as medical malpractice, 
products liability, shareholder derivative actions, corporate 
wrongdoing suits such as antitrust, unlawful conspiracies, and 
intellectual property suits.88 Iqbal expressly held that plausibility 
pleading is the standard under Rule 8(a)(2) and thus is the 
standard that must be met in all federal district court litigation,89 
resolving any doubts on that issue that had remained after 
Twombly.90 Consequently, Iqbal clarified that plausibility 
pleading applies to all civil cases in federal district courts, 
regardless of whether informational asymmetry exists. 
But this universalist application of the plausibility 
standard is in tension with the way the Rules treat state of mind 
 
 85 See Miller, supra note 71, at 61-64 (“The excessive costs of discovery cited 
in Twombly seem to occur in a rather small percentage of cases.”); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the 
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) [hereinafter 
Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray]; Schneider, supra note 7, at 533; Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 
52 SMU L. REV. 229, 246-49 (1999). 
 86 See Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 873; Spencer, Understanding 
Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 24 (“[I]n any case depending on subjective 
motivation or concealed activities the plausibility pleading standard will not 
necessarily accurately identify claims that truly lack merit. Rather, [it] will identify 
claims whose merit depends on information the plaintiff may not yet have.”). 
 87 See Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 879 & n.141; Dodson, New 
Discovery, supra note 10, at 66; Schneider, supra note 7, at 519-21, 531-32; Carl Tobias, Rule 
11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989). 
 88 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 66; Lonny Hoffman, Using Presuit 
Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, LITIG., Summer 2008, at 31, 32; Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 33. The information asymmetry dynamic 
presented in these sorts of cases—that of “informed defendants and uninformed plaintiffs”—
poses particular problems, and thus these cases “prompt some of the most serious concerns 
about frivolous suits.” Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 925. 
 89 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009); Bone, Comment on Iqbal, 
supra note 7, at 858. 
 90 One interpretation of Twombly had been that its plausibility pleading standard 
was limited in some way, such as that it was limited to antitrust cases, or perhaps complex 
cases in which extensive discovery could be expected. 
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allegations. Rule 9(b) specifies that state of mind allegations can 
be alleged generally.91 True, it is possible to reconcile these two 
approaches by treating Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading as the 
general standard, subject to a specific exception in Rule 9(b) for 
state of mind allegations, which can continue to be pled generally 
even after Twombly and Iqbal. The problem is that Iqbal itself 
implicitly rejects this possibility because it seems to require 
specific pleading of detailed facts with regard to Ashcroft’s and 
Mueller’s discriminatory intent, rejecting as conclusory Iqbal’s 
direct but general allegations on the issue.92 
Perhaps Iqbal did not mean to require specific pleading of 
state of mind, but that seems unlikely because such a 
requirement seems crucial to its belief that defendants Mueller’s 
and Ashcroft’s motions to dismiss should be granted. For example, 
it is speculative to predict how the Court would have ruled on the 
motions to dismiss had Iqbal specifically identified the state of 
mind allegations as “likely hav[ing] evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery,” 
which Rule 11(b)(3) says is sufficient.93 But it is difficult to 
imagine that would have made a difference to the Iqbal majority, 
which clearly preferred dismissal. After all, to the Iqbal majority, 
discovery—which Rule 11(b)(3) promises—was the problem. It 
was not a solution. So even if Iqbal had specifically invoked Rule 
11(b)(3), the majority likely would have found a way around it, 
perhaps by simply declaring that Rule 11(b)(3) does not provide a 
safe harbor for conclusory allegations. 
Apparently appalled by the power given to plaintiffs 
through discovery in our adversarial system—most likely a 
minority of plaintiffs—the Supreme Court has now seriously 
disadvantaged all plaintiffs by using pleading doctrine to raise 
the wall that separates them from discovery. 
D. Unfairly Underinclusive 
Using plausibility pleading to address the discovery 
concerns that animated the Twombly and Iqbal Courts is also 
unfair because this “solution” does nothing to address defendant 
discovery abuse. This one-sided approach to discovery abuse 
constitutes part of the unfairness inherent in Twombly and Iqbal, 
in which no justice—either in the majority or dissent—evinced 
 
 91 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 92 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87; Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 860. 
 93 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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the slightest concern about discovery abuse by defendants, though 
it plays a significant if not primary role in any such problem.94 
It is no answer to assert that defendant discovery abuse is 
of lesser concern because defendants, unlike plaintiffs, did not 
voluntarily choose to be in court. Discovery abuse by either side 
raises similarly serious problems and concerns. If plaintiff-side 
discovery abuse can lead to nuisance settlements, defendant-side 
discovery abuse can manipulate outcomes, including producing 
lower settlements, such as through improper non-production of 
prejudicial evidence, as well as inefficiencies and delays that 
prejudice plaintiffs and waste judicial resources, such as in the 
case of scorched-earth discovery practice and motions. 
E. A Misconceived Right to Avoid Discovery: The Qualified 
Immunity Canard 
Concern that notice pleading does not sufficiently 
correlate with ultimate merit—what I call pleading-merits 
dissonance, a topic I discuss in more detail below95—seems to 
animate Twombly and Iqbal and their hostility to the notion of 
subjecting the relevant defendants in those cases to discovery,96 
which leads to yet another criticism of those decisions: they 
come perilously close to transposing the notions underlying 
qualified immunity doctrine from a select group of defendants 
to all defendants, but without sufficient doctrinal justification. 
Of course, qualified immunity was indeed at issue in Iqbal. But 
it was not applicable in Twombly, the first case that gave us 
plausibility pleading. Moreover, the Iqbal majority clarified 
that the plausibility pleading standard is applicable to all civil 
actions filed in federal trial courts.97 The standard is not 
limited to instances when qualified immunity is at issue. 
Qualified immunity doctrine provides public officials 
with more than an additional defense. It provides them with a 
special one that entitles them, if it successfully applies, to not 
only a non-liability verdict, but also to an actual right not to be 
 
 94 See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two 
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1217, 1233 (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff]; Mullenix, Discovery in 
Disarray, supra note 85, at 1401; see, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 270 F. App’x 372, 
376 (6th Cir. 2008); Atlas Res., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 291 F.R.D. 638, 650 (D.N.M. 
2013); Perkinson v. Houlihans/D.C., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 667, 671 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 95 See infra Part II. 
 96 The Supreme Court majorities in both Twombly and Iqbal grounded their 
adoption of the plausibility pleading standard in significant part upon concerns about 
discovery burdens. See supra note 10. 
 97 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
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sued.98 It is because qualified immunity represents a right to be 
free from suit that the Supreme Court has declared that the 
defense should be resolved in the early stages of litigation.99 
Moreover, the right is so strongly protected that the qualified 
immunity defense constitutes a rare exception to the final 
judgment rule, so that interlocutory appeals are allowed in an 
effort to preserve the right.100 
The desire to shield governmental defendants from 
nettlesome and burdensome discovery is a primary justification 
for qualified immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the “driving force” behind creation of the 
qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that 
“‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be 
resolved prior to discovery.”101 Thus, “[u]nless the plaintiff’s 
allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a 
defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal 
before the commencement of discovery.”102 Iqbal emphasized 
discovery’s dangers, stating that: 
[o]ur rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially 
important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled 
to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust of the 
qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of 
litigation, including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.” . . . If a 
Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the 
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive 
to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating 
in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should 
proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply 
with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure 
of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the 
proper execution of the work of the Government.103 
The Court’s references to “efficiency” and the 
“expenditure of valuable time and resources” are broad enough 
to encompass concerns about wasteful time, effort, and resources 
that defendants and courts expend during discovery in cases 
 
 98 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 99 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 
U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 818 (1982). 
 100 See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 527-30. The final judgment rule is codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2013). 
 101 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818-19); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2009); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526; 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18 (indicating that discovery should be stayed pending resolution of 
qualified immunity defense). But see infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 102 Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526. 
 103 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 
226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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that are ultimately dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 
Consequently, it is no surprise that the Court has previously 
emphasized that, if discovery is allowed in order to assess a 
qualified immunity defense,104 then such discovery should be 
limited or narrowly tailored specifically to the qualified 
immunity issues.105 
But this possibility was not good enough for the Iqbal 
Court, which placed discovery at or near the top of the causes for 
waste, a point it stressed when it emphasized the importance of 
avoiding these problems in the qualified immunity context while 
rejecting limited discovery as a safeguard. 
It is no answer . . . to say that discovery for petitioners can be 
deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It 
is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, 
it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to 
participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a 
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position. 
Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery 
orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery. 
We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading 
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises 
petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That promise provides 
especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are 
impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for 
high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from 
the vigorous performance of their duties. Because respondent’s 
complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, 
cabined or otherwise.106 
By placing so much emphasis upon discovery avoidance as 
a primary justification for imposing plausibility pleading, 
Twombly and Iqbal suggest that discovery has become so 
burdensome that defendants should at a minimum enjoy greater 
protections from it, if not a right to avoid it as under qualified 
immunity doctrine. Whatever one’s views on this issue, this 
expansion of a “right” to avoid discovery is in significant tension 
with the justifications for qualified immunity doctrine, which are 
inapplicable to private defendants. The Supreme Court justifies 
qualified immunity doctrine on the basis that it serves the 
important goal of avoiding unnecessary social costs in meritless 
cases, such as “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official 
 
 104 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6 (recognizing that discovery may be required 
prior to adjudicating qualified immunity defense on summary judgment). 
 105 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-600 (1998). 
 106 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685-86. 
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energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able 
citizens from acceptance of public office,” as well as inhibiting 
public officials from the performance of their duties.107 Of these 
rationales, only the expense of litigation is even potentially 
applicable to private defendants, but the concern that underlies 
it—protecting the public treasury—shows that it is inapposite. 
While a nuisance settlement concern exists in both general and 
qualified immunity litigation, that concern is not of sufficient 
magnitude in private litigation such as to rival the public values 
at stake in the qualified immunity context, and thus does not 
justify extending a right to avoid discovery into general litigation. 
The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal used pleading 
doctrine to narrow the space for discovery in general civil 
litigation in a manner that is resonant with qualified immunity 
litigation. The Court has established a qualified immunity 
jurisprudence that protects governmental defendants from 
discovery on the basis that they enjoy a right to avoid litigation. 
After Twombly and Iqbal, it has now established a general 
jurisprudence for all civil defendants that uses pleading doctrine 
to protect them from litigation, in significant part on the basis 
that they should enjoy a greater right to avoid discovery. 
Qualified immunity defendants still continue to enjoy stronger 
protections against discovery, for example due to the interlocutory 
appeal rights they enjoy,108 but the space has narrowed 
considerably after Twombly and Iqbal. This quasi-equivalence 
elides the substantive distinctions that exist between general and 
qualified immunity litigation, and ignores the many cases where 
discovery is necessary to properly evaluate whether a case should 
be subject to a pre-trial dismissal. 
II. THE CASE FOR REFORMING DISCOVERY, NOT PLEADING 
There are more preferable remedies to a discovery 
problem, if one exists, than the plausibility pleading solution that 
Twombly and Iqbal applied. An end to transsubstantive pleading 
is one option. Even better is to reform discovery itself, which could 
range from an end to transsubstantive discovery Rules or, as I 
will suggest below, maintaining transsubstantive discovery but 
greatly expanding the available toolkit for better tailoring 
discovery to the particular circumstances presented in any one 
case. Rather than suggest such options or initiate them, however, 
 
 107 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
 108 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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the Supreme Court imposed plausibility pleading. By doing so, 
the Court raised the question of whether it was best placed at an 
institutional level to consider the intricate, important, and varied 
issues about informational transparency that partly animated 
Twombly and Iqbal, or whether, for example, that process was 
better suited to a legislative or rulemaking determination.109 If 
this is correct, it strengthens the procedural objection that 
Twombly and Iqbal lack legitimacy for achieving a substantive 
change to pleading that was properly available only through the 
Rules Enabling Act process.110 
To improve the judicial process in the manner sought by 
Twombly and Iqbal, reforming discovery is a more advisable 
course than imposing more stringent pleading requirements. 
Though not specifically directing his analysis to Twombly and 
Iqbal and their plausibility pleading standard, Professor Bone 
has used game theory to persuasively demonstrate that stricter 
pleading requirements should have the undesirable effect of 
leading to the dismissal of meritorious claims.111 Additionally, 
Professor Alexander Reinert has concluded that, based on an 
empirical study conducted after Twombly and Iqbal, thinly 
pleaded cases have been at least as successful as heavily 
pleaded cases.112 Yet plausibility pleading’s more demanding 
requirements are likely to lead to the dismissal of some, many, 
or all of these lightly pled but meritorious claims, consistent 
 
 109 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-74 (2012) (establishing the legislative process through 
the Judicial Conference for amending the Rules). The legislative or rulemaking process, 
including as represented by the Advisory and Standing Committees, is not a panacea. Like 
all such processes, it is subject to drawbacks. One example includes lobbying, potential 
capture, or undue influence by special interests, which could be magnified by an end to 
transsubstantive pleading that would open the door to greater legislative activity with 
regard to the Rules. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: 
Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 616 (2010). Another commentator has argued 
that the process has become mired in inadvisable “wordsmithing” due to uncertainties and 
second-guessing. Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial 
Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 449, 470 (2013). 
 110 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 850; see also Bone, Regulation of 
Court Access, supra note 9, at 909, 918, 935 (arguing that using the formal rulemaking 
process would be preferable if plausibility pleading is to be interpreted as strict 
pleading); Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 851-52 (acknowledging that Iqbal 
imposed a new “thick screening” plausibility standard); supra note 32 (citing to REA 
and quoting relevant language). 
  Professor Hartnett contends that Twombly imposes only a modest pleading 
reform, and likely a beneficial one, and he notes others who defend it as well. See Hartnett, 
supra note 8, at 474-75, 476 n.19, 501. But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to 
Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710 (2013). 
 111 Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 523, 
587-89 (1997) [hereinafter Modeling Frivolous Suits]; see also Bone, Improving Rule 1, 
supra note 55, at 303-04. 
 112 Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011). 
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with Bone’s prediction.113 Twombly and Iqbal ignore this problem 
because they frame the question as being whether a plaintiff has 
pled a sufficiently persuasive case so as to justify requiring the 
defendant to disclose information through discovery. Fair enough, 
but the problem with such framing is that there is always a 
counterframing, such as: what valid interest exists in keeping 
information hidden that would support a legitimate legal claim? 
The answer the discovery Rules provide is: very little.114 
Considering the competing ways of framing the issue yields 
a useful insight, which is that neither is a particularly helpful way 
of thinking about the problem. This is because both the frame and 
counterframe beg the real issue: which party should bear the risk 
that the case is illegitimate? 
This question is more complicated than Twombly or Iqbal 
acknowledge, and their failure to sincerely grapple with it 
represents their biggest fault. Because they are pleading cases, 
these opinions implicitly suggest that the illegitimacy issue arises 
in only one direction, namely that of plaintiffs raising 
unmeritorious claims. But pleading illegitimacy has another face 
as well, that of defendants raising unmeritorious defenses to valid 
claims. This duality raises at least two separate concerns, and, 
though often there will be considerable overlap between them, it 
is helpful to consider them independently. The first concern is 
about pleading-merits dissonance, while the second is about 
pleading-discovery dissonance. 
Pleading-merits dissonance speaks to the possibility that 
cases can be adequately pled, and thus brought into the federal 
court system, yet nonetheless be resolved on terms divorced from 
 
 113 Empirical assessments on the impact that Twombly and Iqbal are having on 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions are abundant and ongoing. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 
7, at 839 n.66; Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact 
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012); William H. J. Hubbard, The Problem of 
Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 575, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1883831; William M. Janssen, Iqbal 
“Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 571-82 
(2011). The Federal Judicial Center is involved in these efforts. E.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED 
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf; JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf. Some of the 
Federal Judicial Center’s conclusions have been challenged. See Lonny Hoffman, Twombly 
and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to 
Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).  
 114 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text for some bases of exclusion 
that are explicitly recognized in the Rules. 
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the true merits of the case. This concern applies to any resolution 
of a case, whether an adjudicated outcome or through settlement. 
We hope that adjudicated outcomes are just, in the sense that 
they accurately reflect the underlying merits of a case (what 
Professor Bone has referred to as the parties’ “substantive 
entitlements”115), but there are myriad reasons (such as 
procedural deficiencies, evidentiary problems, or overly broad or 
underinclusive substantive law, for example) why they might not. 
A similar dissonance between pleading and merits can occur with 
settlements, either because plaintiffs benefit from receiving a 
nuisance settlement that defendants are willing to pay to rid 
themselves of the suit, or because defendants are able to induce 
plaintiffs to settle for a lower amount than the case is worth given 
its underlying value. 
The other concern is about pleading-discovery dissonance: 
namely, that our current transsubstantive discovery regime can 
be abused to foster a suboptimal outcome by using discovery as a 
bludgeon. This can, but need not necessarily, play a role in 
pleading-merits dissonance. It is a familiar critique that 
defendants may agree to nuisance settlements to avoid discovery 
or other litigation costs that plaintiffs can impose. This is what I 
mean when I refer to using “discovery as a bludgeon.” Twombly 
was clearly concerned about this possibility. It linked the 
prospect of “enormous” discovery costs to the specter of nuisance 
settlements, explaining that “the threat of discovery expense 
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases 
before reaching” summary judgment or a jury verdict.116 
Consequently, it emphasized that “something beyond the mere 
possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with 
a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time of a 
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an 
in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”117 Iqbal also 
adverted to a different form of this problem when it expressed a 
preference for freeing high-level government officials from 
discovery.118 In these sorts of instances, discovery burdens can 
distort case outcomes, such as if a settlement is not an accurate 
reflection of the case’s underlying merits. They thus represent 
examples of pleading-discovery dissonance contributing to 
 
 115 Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 302. Professor Bone notes that 
accuracy is not the only possible determinant of justice. See id. at 289 (also referring to 
“symbolic effects, educative value,” and participatory fairness). 
 116 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 117 Id. at 557-58 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 118 See supra text accompanying notes 103, 106. 
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pleading-merits dissonance. But this causal relationship does 
not always exist. For example, whether or not pleading-
discovery dissonance occurs, pleading-merits dissonance might. 
This can occur for many reasons independent of pleading-
discovery dissonance, such as poor lawyer performance, witness 
or evidentiary difficulties, or a jury misunderstanding its 
instructions or taking prohibited factors into account. 
Though Twombly and Iqbal speak most directly about 
pleading-merits dissonance, the opinions are animated by the 
related concern of pleading-discovery dissonance.119 With respect 
to the latter, the Court fails in a similar, one-sided way as it does 
with the former, portraying the deficiency as unidirectional, with 
lax pleading allowing plaintiffs to threaten defendants with 
unwarranted discovery burdens and costs. But, again, the problem 
is really bilateral, as defendants have a similar ability and their 
own incentives of a comparable nature to abuse discovery by 
improperly imposing burdens and costs on plaintiffs.120 
Twombly and Iqbal’s choice of applying a pleading 
solution to a perceived discovery problem is particularly clumsy 
because there is no way of knowing ex ante whether any given 
claim is legitimate. Related to this last point (because it helps 
explain why illegitimate claims or defenses are maintained and 
why the discovery concern is so often dominant in discussions 
about litigation) is that information often, and in the litigation 
context perhaps always, has economic value. Thus, the flip side 
of my counterframing about risk of illegitimacy is yet another 
framing: who should be allowed, through litigation, to exploit 
the value of information, and in which circumstances? 
Twombly and Iqbal are rightly controversial because their 
answer to this question is vastly different from the answer given 
in the previously controlling case, Conley v. Gibson.121 Conley 
placed emphasis on the pleading-merits link by favoring the 
claimant that was actually wronged, that should win on the 
merits. In a world of ambiguity, where these claimants cannot be 
identified ex ante, and where numerous non-merits obstacles may 
prevent such a claimant from prevailing, Conley imposed a lax 
 
 119 See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 919 (“The Twombly 
Court assumes that the cause of meritless filings is asymmetry of discovery costs and 
the settlement leverage it confers.”) (citation omitted); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 
7, at 852 (noting that the Supreme Court “clearly had concerns about meritless claims 
flooding the courts and generating heaps of discovery”); Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff, 
supra note 94, at 1231-34; Malveaux, supra note 10, at 107. 
 120 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 121 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
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notice pleading standard that favored that claimant,122 with the 
goal of allowing access to discovery in the hope that the 
ultimate resolution of the suit, through whatever mechanism, 
would best approach the underlying merits.123 “Most observers 
retained the belief that this choice was a good one.”124 Yet, in 
doing so, Conley accepts a cost inherent in adopting notice 
pleading, namely the possibility of pleading-discovery dissonance: 
that unmeritorious claimants can nonetheless benefit from lax 
pleading to use discovery for illegitimate ends,125 such as to 
impose costs and burdens, embarrass the responding party, 
encourage nuisance settlements, or leak closely-held information. 
Like Conley, Twombly and Iqbal also give primacy to the 
pleading-merits link. But Twombly and Iqbal do so in a crucially 
different way, by emphasizing and seeking to minimize the cost 
that Conley accepted—namely, the pleading-discovery dissonance 
that can result in suboptimal outcomes made possible by lax 
pleading standards. Because they are animated by a concern 
about pleading-discovery dissonance, Twombly and Iqbal seek to 
minimize it. To promote this goal, they favor the party with the 
best ex ante access to information, who can either satisfy the new, 
more demanding plausibility pleading standard, or point out that 
this standard has not been met given the universe of potentially 
applicable facts.126 Typically, this will disfavor plaintiffs and 
 
 122 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see Dodson, Comparative 
Pleading, supra note 8, at 450 n.59 (noting scholarly disagreement about whether 
Conley correctly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring only notice pleading). 
 123 See Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 297, 302, 304; Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 7, at 825, 838. 
 124 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 825. 
 125 See Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 296-97 (explaining that the 
“rule drafters” tended to believe that efficiency was improved through resolution on the 
merits because it avoided needless litigation over technicalities, but suggesting that this 
led them to overlook the possibility of inefficiency that can result from “making it easy to 
sue, [which means that] notice pleading invites frivolous suits, which in turn increase 
litigation costs, add to system delays, and produce unjustified settlements,” and pointing 
out that one such source of inefficiency is discovery abuse); see also Clermont & Yeazell, 
supra note 7, at 825 (“Some of the persistent opposition to such permissive pleading 
flowed from the costs of the later stages, to which the Rules had transferred the screening 
function. Uncovering evidence to demonstrate the weakness of the plaintiff ’ s claim 
entails expenses that the defendant cannot recoup from the plaintiff.”). 
 126 The Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading requirement imposes upon 
plaintiffs a duty to explain away competing, sufficiently plausible lawful alternative 
explanations for the disputed conduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-82 (2009); 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 567-68, 570 (2007); Clermont & Yeazell, 
supra note 7, at 832-33, 836-37; Effron, supra note 10, at 2014. This is a highly novel 
pleading standard that is more demanding than even comparative pleading systems that 
require factual specificity akin to fact pleading (though plausibility remains less demanding 
than some systems that require production of evidence at the pleading stage). See Dodson, 
Comparative Pleading, supra note 8, at 452-55, 463 (describing comparative pleading 
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favor defendants. Consequently, Twombly and Iqbal take the 
opposite approach from Conley on the risk of pleading-merits 
dissonance: while Conley favored claimants, Twombly and 
Iqbal disfavor them. 
Confronted by the same world of ambiguity as the Conley 
Court, Twombly and Iqbal make the opposite choice from Conley 
and instead tip the scales toward the party that will often have 
the least need for discovery—usually the defendant.127 This is a 
momentous choice because, as a result of their change in emphasis, 
the party Twombly and Iqbal favor will be the opposite of the one 
that Conley favored, as shown most clearly in cases of information 
asymmetry.128 It is no accident that Twombly and Iqbal are 
controversial for being pro-defendant: the majorities in each case 
wholeheartedly embrace the defense side of a highly contested 
debate about pleading-discovery dissonance.129 By doing so, 
Twombly and Iqbal are putting plaintiffs into a “Catch-22” where 
the facts necessary to survive a pleading challenge can only be 
obtained through what is now inaccessible discovery, a particular 
problem in cases involving information asymmetry.130 Twombly 
and Iqbal, with their imposition of plausibility pleading, have 
thus “destabilized” the system that the Rules established,131 which 
was premised upon access to discovery and in which discovery, 
not pleading, was by far the more important sorting device for 
weeding meritorious from non-meritorious cases.132 It may well be 
that the greatest problem with Twombly and Iqbal is that they 
either consciously ignore or overlook the information asymmetry 
problem. Indeed, it has been argued that this failure caused 
Twombly to misdiagnose the problem it sought to remedy.133 
                                                                                                             
 
systems, none of which require explaining away lawful alternative explanations for the 
disputed conduct, though some require production of evidence at the pleading stage). 
 127 Cf. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 830 (“The plaintiff who needs 
discovery to learn the required factual particulars is the person whom the Court has newly 
put in jeopardy.”) (citation omitted). 
 128 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 56; Spencer, Understanding 
Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 28. 
 129 Plaintiff and defense counsel disagree sharply about whether pleading can be 
a useful tool for minimizing discovery problems. See LITIG. SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 7 (2009) [hereinafter ABA LITIGATION 
SECTION SURVEY], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
litigation/survey/docs/report_aba_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 130 Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 874 n.117; Dodson, New 
Discovery, supra note 10, at 68. 
 131 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 132 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 133 Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 878-79, 920-22. 
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Twombly and Iqbal took the destabilizing step of 
imposing plausibility pleading in large measure because of their 
concern about discovery and the distorting effects of pleading-
discovery dissonance. While Conley placed faith in discovery, 
Twombly and Iqbal have so lost faith that they speak disparagingly 
of it.134 The attitude is starkly evidenced in a remark that Justice 
Scalia made during the Iqbal oral argument. In response to the 
suggestion that the discovery rules and qualified immunity 
doctrine are adequate to protect government officials, he 
exclaimed, “Well, I mean, that’s lovely: That the ability of the 
Attorney General and the Director of the FBI to—to do their jobs 
without having to litigate personal liability is dependent upon 
the discretionary decision of a single district judge.”135 He 
reportedly “pronounce[d] district court judge the way you or I 
might say serial wife-beater.”136 As a result, while Conley favors 
the claimant who was wronged, Twombly and Iqbal willingly 
sacrifice some such parties to the goal of reducing pleading-
merits dissonance by decreasing the number of suboptimal 
outcomes attributable to pleading-discovery dissonance. 
The problem is simply that the [plausibility pleading] standard is not 
sufficiently calibrated to perceive merit but rather is designed more for 
the purpose of protecting scarce economic and judicial resources from 
waste. In short, in the competition between efficiency and justice, 
plausibility pleading is designed to err on the side of efficiency.137 
Thus, though the new plausibility pleading regime “would 
doubtless reduce whatever frequency of weakly founded suits 
that now exists,”138 it 
would also doubtless reduce the frequency of well-founded suits that 
now require the assistance of discovery to make their merits clear. 
The new procedural regime would exchange our current false 
positives for an unknown number of false negatives. Today, 
defendants as a group shoulder the burden of false positives. In the 
hypothesized new regime, plaintiffs would shoulder the burden of 
false negatives.139 
 
 134 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-86 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 558-60 & n.6 (2007); Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 859. 
 135 Iqbal Transcript, supra note 1, at 35. 
 136 Dahlia Lithwick, The Attorney General Is a Very Busy Man: The Supreme 
Court seems to think that also makes him immune from litigation, SLATE (Dec. 10, 
2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2206441/pagenum/all/#p2.  
 137 Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 25. 
 138 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 838. 
 139 Id.; see also Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 878-79. 
1518 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4 
Given these consequences, one’s views about the 
legitimacy of Twombly and Iqbal likely turn upon one’s views 
about pleading-merits dissonance. Twombly and Iqbal must 
presume that a sufficient correlation exists between pleading 
and the merits of a case. They must further presume that to the 
extent there is an imperfect correlation, which will lead to 
dismissals on pleading grounds despite the claim’s underlying 
merit, the attendant costs are worthwhile as a means of avoiding 
discovery abuses. But using strict pleading transsubstantively as 
a method for fighting unmeritorious suits, as Twombly and Iqbal 
do with their adoption of plausibility pleading, is inadvisable 
because it is too blunt an instrument.140 At a minimum, “[f]actual 
sufficiency” in pleadings “is . . . a poor proxy for meritlessness” in 
cases of information asymmetry,141 something that the Twombly 
and Iqbal majorities simply ignore.142 The decisions are thus 
rightly controversial because they implicitly claim that the 
costs of wrongful dismissals in cases of information asymmetry 
are worthwhile—a highly contentious assertion, and one that 
sounds an awful lot like a complicated policy determination 
that should have been left to the legislative or rulemaking 
process rather than judicial fiat.143 
Another objectionable feature about Twombly and Iqbal 
is that their view of pleading-merits dissonance—their faith in 
the correlation between pleading and the underlying merits—is at 
odds with repeatedly (and many would say painfully) learned 
historical lessons.144 In again embracing a heightened pleading 
regime, Twombly and Iqbal threaten a return to the times of early 
 
 140 See Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 111, at 587-89 (explaining that 
“strict pleading has some potential benefits” but is also “likely to generate substantial costs,” 
and thus “the case for strict pleading is much weaker than commonly supposed”; 
consequently, strict pleading should not be applied transsubstantively). 
 141 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 68; see also Webb v. Nashville Area 
Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 437 (Tenn. 2011) (declining to adopt 
plausibility pleading as a matter of state law, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that 
“[o]ur motion-to-dismiss jurisprudence reflects the principle that this stage of the 
proceedings is particularly ill-suited for an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the 
merits or of the weight of the facts pleaded”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 
49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 483 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading]. 
 142 Justice Souter, who authored Twombly but then regretted how plausibility 
pleading was used in Iqbal, in which he dissented, continues to press this point even after 
retiring from the Supreme Court bench. See Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of 
Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J., sitting by designation) (asserting 
that plausibility is not “a standard of likely success on the merits” and still requires 
“assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff ’ s favor”). 
 143 See Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1483 (2013); Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 883-85; see also 
supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. 
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technical dismissals without access to discovery, but through an 
inappropriate sleight of hand that threatens to wall off discovery 
without grappling with the substantive policy question concerning 
the scope of discovery rights. 
III. BETTER SOLUTIONS TO A “DISCOVERY PROBLEM” 
It is rather shocking that in Twombly and Iqbal the 
Supreme Court identified discovery as the primary problem while 
failing to consider discovery reform as a solution or seeking a 
better understanding of the perceived problem. It is rudimentary 
that to apply a better solution, one needs the best available 
understanding of the problem. These errors contributed to the 
Twombly and Iqbal misprescription of a pleading solution for a 
perceived discovery problem. The Supreme Court approached 
Twombly and Iqbal with skepticism because adhering to the low 
notice pleading standard threatened discovery, which the Court 
viewed as problematic. The Court’s deep skepticism was starkly 
evident in its brisk dismissal of the possibility that district court 
judges could protect defendants from overly burdensome 
discovery. Twombly relied upon Judge Easterbrook’s well-known 
critique of discovery to reject the prospect of supervised discovery, 
invoking the “common lament that the success of judicial 
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest 
side.”145 Iqbal also evinced a distrust of discovery.146 Having 
explained why judicial management offers no solution, the Court 
imposed plausibility pleading in Twombly,147 and reaffirmed in 
Iqbal that the new plausibility standard applies to all plaintiff 
efforts to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s demand for a “short and plain 
statement of the claim” in the complaint.148 
Unfortunately, the Court’s skepticism led it to shoot from 
the hip instead of examining the perceived problem. Concededly, 
the suspicion that Twombly and Iqbal evinced toward discovery 
has some justification. There are numerous aspects of discovery 
that can be problematic. These can be grouped into concerns about 
(1) the direct financial costs of responding to discovery; (2) indirect 
financial costs resulting from disclosure; (3) privacy and dignitary 
costs resulting from disclosure; (4) diversion of party resources, 
which can lead to party disruption and distraction; (5) diversion of 
 
 145 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); see supra Part I.A 
(setting forth Judge Easterbrook’s critique, and rebutting it). 
 146 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
 147 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 148 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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judicial resources; (6) delay; (7) improper non-disclosure; and 
(8) nuisance settlements. Neither Twombly nor Iqbal carefully 
parsed these facets of problematic discovery. Indeed, Twombly 
confounded the distinct discovery concerns of cost and abuse, 
without acknowledging that they can exist independently of each 
other.149 To truly grapple with discovery reform, it is necessary to 
identify discovery’s potentially problematic aspects so as to assess 
the effectiveness of reform proposals. 
Such reform is a better response to discovery concerns 
than is manipulating pleading doctrine. But discovery reforms can 
vary in their advisability. The Advisory Committee has recently 
embarked on a campaign to limit discovery.150 Unfortunately, these 
reforms repeat many of the same errors that occurred with the 
introduction of plausibility pleading. The campaign perpetuates 
the imposition of blunt standards that cannot be responsive to the 
full range of civil litigation and discovery contexts. It also 
wholeheartedly embraces a dominant narrative about problematic 
discovery that is one-sided and thus pursues a reform campaign 
that gives defense counsel much if not all of what they have 
sought,151 while ignoring discovery problems and abuse that the 
defense-side tends to cause. Though admittedly the Advisory 
Committee’s discovery reform efforts are a better way to address 
discovery concerns than was the imposition of plausibility pleading, 
there are better alternatives for accomplishing discovery reform. 
What is truly needed is not less discovery in all cases, but instead 
better tailored discovery in all cases. 
A. Options for Reforming Discovery 
A better course for addressing the discovery concerns that 
animated Twombly and Iqbal is to reform discovery itself. The 
Twombly and Iqbal majorities expressed complete disdain for the 
possibility of using the existing Rules to constrain discovery and 
tailor it to the particularities of a given case.152 I do not share that 
skepticism, but can understand that it may be motivated by a 
deeply held belief that the core of the problem with discovery is 
cultural, not technical. After all, from a technical standpoint, our 
 
 149 Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff, supra note 94, at 1232-33; Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, supra note 141, at 451-53. 
 150 See supra notes 34-35. 
 151 See Patricia W. Moore, “Corporate and Defense Perspective” Prevails in the 
Proposed Step Toward Cost-Shifting in Rule 26(c), CIV. PROCEDURE & FED. CTS. BLOG, 
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/09/corporate-and-defense-
perspective-prevails-in-the-proposed-step-toward-cost-shifting-in-rule-26c.html. 
 152 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43, 134-136. 
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discovery Rules already contain numerous provisions that 
authorize discovery limitations.153 But from a litigant’s perspective 
as well as that of judicial culture, such provisions may provide 
little solace given that our discovery Rules reflect an ethos of 
broad, liberal discovery.154 This cultural slant may explain why 
attorneys surveyed in 2009 generally agreed that “[l]awyers and 
judges could more often avail themselves of existing means to set 
limits on discovery that is unduly burdensome or costly.”155 If 
litigants are pessimistic about gaining discovery protections out of 
a widespread belief that judges are likely to rebuff such efforts,156 
existing Rules providing for discovery limits will remain inert. 
Indeed, judicial culture has embraced a predisposition favoring 
disclosure in discovery.157 Our Rules grant tremendous discretion 
to federal trial judges with regard to discovery.158 This discretion 
can be used to encourage and foster disclosure, or to restrict it. 
But if a litigant believes that the judicial tendency is to allow 
discovery, then there will be little comfort in the mere possibility 
that discretion will be invoked to limit it. This reluctance to accept 
discovery limitations as a realistic possibility in our discovery 
regime seems to have been a decisive factor for the Twombly and 
Iqbal majorities, though the majorities’ position would be more 
persuasive had they indicated even the barest familiarity with the 
Rules that authorize discovery limitations.159 
The Twombly and Iqbal majorities’ unwillingness to 
consider discovery solutions to a perceived discovery problem160 
can be criticized for failing to recognize that culture is not an 
island. Culture does not exist independent of the legal regime—
the Rules—that govern conduct. Rather, rules and culture are 
inexorably and inextricably linked. They intersect and intertwine, 
fold into each other, over, and back again, weave together and 
apart. Sometimes the relationship is symbiotic, sometimes not; 
 
 153 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), (c)(1), (g), 37(a)-(b), (d), (f). 
 154 See supra note 54. 
 155 ABA LITIGATION SECTION SURVEY, supra note 129, at 6. 
 156 See Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery: A 
Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
473, 483 (2010) (noting “[t]he reluctance of courts to impose sanctions under Rule 37”). 
 157 See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 517 (contending that, “[i]n practice,” 
Rule provisions protecting against discovery “lie dormant, or are made subservient, to 
the default rule in favor of virtually unlimited discovery”). 
 158 See Bone, Improving Rule 1, supra note 55, at 288, 292. 
 159 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In their respective dissents in Twombly 
and Iqbal, Justices Stevens and Breyer contended that sufficient tools exist in the Rules for 
federal trial judges to appropriately limit discovery, with Justice Stevens specifying many of 
them. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 699-700 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593-94 & n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 160 On the issue of whether discovery is actually problematic, see supra note 11. 
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sometimes it is inimical, sometimes not; sometimes it operates at 
cross-purposes, sometimes not. Here lies one quite objectionable 
feature of the Twombly and Iqbal majorities’ approach: they 
implicitly ignore or deny the real possibility that new discovery 
initiatives—whether through new interpretations of existing 
Rules or actual new Rules—can sufficiently influence our existing 
discovery culture to provide a meaningful solution to the 
perceived discovery problem.161 
This failure is particularly puzzling given the Supreme 
Court’s own role in our judicial structure. It has singular power 
to change our legal regime and even our social culture. Supreme 
Court campaigns that successfully accomplished such change 
are not unusual, even in the procedural context. The summary 
judgment trilogy,162 the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
cases,163 the movement to reinvigorate the Sixth Amendment 
 
 161 I say “implicitly” because embracing “new discovery initiatives” was not an 
accessible option for the Court in either Twombly or Iqbal. Having decided to grant 
certiorari, the Court had to decide the issues presented, which were framed as pleading 
questions. The Court did not formally have the option of fashioning or launching new 
discovery Rules or interpretations as a means of resolving those cases. Nonetheless, it 
is fair to characterize those decisions as evincing a pessimism about discovery reforms, 
which helps explain the majorities’ choice to engage in a revolutionary pleading reform. 
There are abundant reasons to question the Supreme Court’s pessimism, which is not 
universally shared. For example, the discovery panel at the 2010 Duke Law School civil 
litigation conference, see supra note 8, reportedly: 
did reach a consensus that there are tools available in the current Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to deal with discovery abuse . . . . Although some 
Rules may warrant amendment to discourage discovery abuse and to assure 
that discovery is proportional, judges already have a substantial degree of 
discretion to curb abuse. Numerous speakers stressed that what is important 
is judicial education to assure that judges exercise the discretion available to 
them, together with a change in culture for lawyers and clients. 
Koeltl, supra note 8, at 543-44; see also ACTL/IAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2 
(concluding, based upon survey of American College of Trial Lawyers fellows, that 
“[j]udges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in designing the scope 
of discovery . . . . Where abuses occur, judges are perceived not to enforce the rules 
effectively.”). Fairness requires acknowledging that the final ACTL/IAALS report is just 
as pessimistic about discovery, if not more so, than the Supreme Court was in Twombly 
and Iqbal. The report concludes that “[o]ur discovery system is broken,” and takes the 
“radical” step of making its “most significant proposal,” namely to switch to a 
presumption against further discovery after initial disclosures. ACTL/IAALS, FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (“Once that limited discovery is completed, no more should be 
allowed absent agreement or a court order, which should be made only upon a showing of 
good cause and proportionality.”). 
 162 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574 (1986); see also Schneider, supra note 7, at 537-39 & nn.107-11. 
 163 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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jury trial right in criminal sentencing,164 and indeed the 
Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading innovation all come to 
mind. The most notable example may well be Miranda v. 
Arizona,165 which was preserved when Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
against all expectations and after decades of active and hostile 
resistance, voted in Dickerson v. United States to maintain a 
constitutional requirement that police recite Miranda warnings 
at arrest.166 His reasoning in Dickerson is a powerful rejoinder to 
Twombly and Iqbal’s discovery defeatism: he concluded that the 
Miranda warnings should be preserved because they were not 
just an engrained legal standard, but had “become part of our 
national culture.”167 
The Supreme Court has many options available to 
accomplish a change in the cultural ethos of discovery. It might 
admittedly have difficulty unholstering its most potent and 
obvious weapon, its discretionary appellate power. This is because 
its options for granting certiorari are limited by the final 
judgment rule,168 and discovery disputes do not generally satisfy 
that requirement.169 The Court does, however, retain some power 
to use certiorari to accomplish changes in discovery, such as by 
expressing an interest in the issue in its opinions. Simply by 
commenting on discovery even in dicta the Court could exert 
influence by signaling that it wants discovery tightened. Another 
option would be to encourage in its opinions the use of several 
narrow appellate options, such as the ancillary proceedings or 
collateral order doctrines or mandamus, for routing discovery 
disputes to the Court.170 A more likely route, given its availability 
and efficacy, would be for the Court to call for or initiate either a 
Rules Enabling Act or congressional reform process with regard to 
 
 164 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000). 
 165 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 166 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In numerous intervening 
cases Chief Justice Rehnquist had voted to limit Miranda and its implications. See, e.g., 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 167 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443. 
 168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 169 See 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL 
¶ 202.11[2][a] (3d ed. 2014). 
 170 Though limited grounds such as these do exist for appealing discovery orders, 
they tend to be subject to conflicting authority. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 
U.S. 100 (2009); Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 
1305, 1307 (1977) (Rhenquist, J., denying application for stay as Circuit Justice); In re Carco 
Elecs., 536 F.3d 211, 213 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2008); see generally 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL ¶¶ 202.7, 202.11[2][a]-[b] (3d ed. 2014). 
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discovery.171 One attraction to this option would be that the Court 
could choose how specifically or generally to describe the reform 
effort. Moreover, the Rules Enabling Act route would preserve a 
veto power for the Court.172 
Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the value of a full range 
of discovery reforms, and whether such reforms offer a better path 
for addressing the perceived litigation ills that so troubled the 
Twombly and Iqbal majorities.173 To that end, a series of discovery 
reform proposals are presented below and in the appendix. Any 
single proposal is available for adoption by itself, or as a package 
adopted along with other proposals. Significantly, any such 
reforms can be subjected to anti-abuse procedural requirements. 
For example, Professor Dodson argues that discovery reforms 
adopted in the federal trial courts in response to Twombly and 
Iqbal should have the goal of “rectify[ing] information asymmetry 
without imposing burdensome costs,” and suggests “three 
principles” for such reform: “(1) it should be used sparingly; (2) it 
should be narrowly focused and minimize undue cost; and (3) it 
should toll the running of any applicable limitations period.”174 
1. Heightened Discovery Requirements 
One option for reforming discovery is to impose 
heightened discovery requirements. This option is best suited for 
adoption if a return to notice pleading is successful.175 In this 
way, the more forgiving notice pleading standard can be 
counterbalanced by tougher discovery standards. No doubt many 
stakeholders would love to have plausibility pleading combined 
with heightened discovery standards, but such an approach 
would constitute a dangerous “double whammy” that could 
seriously compromise court access and the vindication of rights. 
Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee has pursued this 
“double whammy” approach, mostly with success.176 
 
 171 See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of 
Civil Procedure: Lessons From Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012). 
 172 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2074 (2013). 
 173 One important counterargument is that this proposal would increase judicial 
discretion, which can be argued to be an important part of the problem, rather than a 
solution. See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 899-900. 
 174 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 75-85. 
 175 Numerous actors have been involved in responding to the Twombly and 
Iqbal adoption of plausibility pleading, and many of these efforts hoped to return to notice 
pleading. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(introduced by Senator Arlen Specter); Open Access to Courts Act, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (introduced by Representative Jerrold Nadler). 
 176 See supra notes 34-35. 
2015] DISCOVERYMANIA 1525 
 
Heightened discovery would require a party seeking 
discovery to satisfy a more demanding showing before gaining 
access to it. One such proposal is to explicitly adopt, and 
potentially reconceive, proportional discovery,177 a concept that is 
already implicit in the discovery Rules.178 An existing iteration of 
such an approach calls for reducing relevancy’s power,179 thereby 
ending what is essentially a presumption in favor of discovery, 
and instead giving priority to “a rational cost/benefit analysis that 
takes into account the parties’ resources, the issues at stake in the 
litigation, and other proportionality factors.”180 
This is exactly the approach the Advisory Committee has 
taken: it proposes to expressly reference this sort of proportionality 
in Rule 26(b)(1),181 which sets out the initial scope of discovery. No 
longer will proportionality only be implicitly addressed in Rule 
26(b)(2)(C), which sets out bases for seeking discovery limitations. 
Thus, the Advisory Committee’s approach to proportionality is 
twofold: it expressly adopts proportionality and it changes the locus 
of that standard. The latter amendment would make it harder for a 
party to obtain discovery. Currently, under Rule 26(b)(1) this party 
need only establish relevancy, and overcome any privilege 
objection, to presumptively access discovery.182 Under the Advisory 
Committee’s proposed amendment, that same party would now 
have to additionally overcome a proportionality analysis. 
Other means of heightening discovery standards could 
seek to impose controls upon discovery. These controls could 
promote the goals of providing access to discovery, but as 
Professor Dodson has suggested make resort to it sparing, narrow 
the focus of discovery, and minimize its costs.183 Depending on 
how these reforms are implemented, they might reduce the 
adversarial characteristic of party control in our discovery, 
 
 177 See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 527-32. 
 178 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A 
Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2010); see also id. at 459 (quoting In re 
Convergent Techs. Securities Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). 
 179 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that nonprivileged information is subject 
to discovery so long as it is relevant). 
 180 Netzorg & Kern, supra note 29, at 531. It is possible to tailor this discovery 
reform option in numerous ways to satisfy policy goals, such as through identifying the 
standard that plaintiff must meet before accessing discovery. For example, Professors 
Clermont and Yeazell have suggested the possibility of adopting a probable cause 
standard for believing that discovery will reveal pertinent information, comparable to 
what exists in Fourth Amendment search warrant procedure. Clermont & Yeazell, 
supra note 7, at 855-56. 
 181 See supra note 35. 
 182 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 183 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 75-84. 
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moving us along a continuum toward a more inquisitorial system 
in which judges are given more control over discovery.184 
2. Plausibility Discovery 
Another option is to create a new tier of discovery that 
might be called “plausibility discovery,” which would explicitly 
allow limited, post-complaint but pre-dismissal discovery to 
address the new plausibility pleading burden.185 It would create 
a two-tiered discovery system in which a new plausibility 
discovery opportunity would exist for plaintiffs, in addition to 
traditional discovery. 
Such an approach has already been tried on an ad hoc 
basis.186 Significantly, it is subject to the imposition of procedural 
requirements designed to minimize its misuse. For example, one 
could require the filing of a pre-discovery affidavit explaining 
investigatory efforts to date to help assure that plausibility 
discovery is merited and is being conducted properly,187 and an 
affirmation that the information sought is in the defendant’s 
possession, custody, or control and has not been successfully 
obtained either from the defendant or other alternate sources.188 
The opportunity to conduct pre-dismissal plausibility 
discovery should be implemented through explicit revision of the 
Rules.189 Some commentators contend that Rule 26 already allows 
for pre-dismissal discovery.190 The better view supports explicit 
amendment, for at least two reasons. First, “[a]llowing pleading-
stage discovery fits the current Rules awkwardly at best.”191 
 
 184 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 855 & n.128. See generally JA Jolowicz, 
Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 281, 287-89 
(2003). For a brief but useful discussion of the distinction between adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems, see Kessler, supra note 11, at 1187-88 & nn.22-23, 25. 
 185 See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 932-35; Dodson, New 
Discovery, supra note 10, at 56-57, 73; Malveaux, supra note 10, at 108; Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 30. 
 186 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Kregler v. City of New York, 646 F. Supp. 2d 570, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 187 Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 933-34. 
 188 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 78-79. 
 189 Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 934-35. 
 190 Hartnett, supra note 8, at 507-08, 512-14; Malveaux, supra note 96, at 108-24. 
 191 Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 9, at 935 (citation omitted); see 
also Malveaux, supra note 96, at 126-27 & nn.361-62 (citing federal courts of appeals cases 
suggesting disapproval of discovery before ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 
Professor Hartnett strongly disagrees, and has provided a detailed account of his reasoning. 
Hartnett, supra note 8, at 507-14 & n.151; see also Spencer, Understanding Pleading 
Doctrine, supra note 68, at 30 & n.142. The debate between Professors Bone and Hartnett 
may rest upon the differences between the practical realities of litigation and formalistic 
analyses of the Rules. In any event, even Hartnett agrees that, after Twombly and Iqbal, a 
worst-case scenario is possible for plaintiffs in which they are caught in a Catch-22 of an 
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Second, an explicit amendment will clearly signal a rejection of 
the proposal to presumptively prohibit discovery while a motion to 
dismiss is pending.192 
3. Pre-litigation Discovery 
Another way to reform discovery in response to 
Twombly and Iqbal is to expand the opportunity for discovery 
even before filing a lawsuit. Given existing rhetoric about 
frivolous litigation and “fishing expeditions,”193 this suggestion 
will certainly be controversial. But there are strong reasons to 
doubt that pre-litigation discovery would result in frivolous 
litigation. Under the Rules, numerous provisions deter such 
behavior, such as certification requirements, the opportunity 
for an early adjudicated dismissal, and sanctions for discovery 
abuse or frivolous litigation.194 As an economic matter, such 
behavior is an expensive way for plaintiffs’ lawyers to do 
business given rational incentives to aim at a likely worthwhile 
target rather than shooting wildly,195 particularly given the 
disincentives to such behavior under the Rules. Indeed, after 
studying a Texas provision that allows some pre-litigation 
discovery,196 Professor Hoffman has determined that, at least 
when combined with “various formal requirements for instituting 
                                                                                                             
 
early dismissal on pleading grounds while also being unable to obtain discovery that could 
have avoided the dismissal. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 509 (describing scenarios that “critics 
of Twombly would certainly fear”); see also Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 874 
n.117; Hartnett, supra note 8, at 513-14 (noting large discretion trial judges enjoy to stay 
discovery, and unlikelihood of appellate relief in these and other circumstances). 
Amendment is preferable because it would help avoid such worst-case scenarios. The 
current opportunity to engage in pre-dismissal discovery is sufficiently uncertain that one 
commentator has suggested adopting an optional two-stage complaint pleading regime 
sandwiched around a limited, express discovery phase. Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a 
Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 1191, 1239-45 (2010); id. at 1241 (arguing that “[t]he problem” with pre-
dismissal discovery now “is that [it] depends entirely on the inclinations of the individual 
judge and cannot be predicted systematically in advance”). 
 192 See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 547 n.†, 592-93 (2010) (suggesting, in an article 
written “on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform,” that the presumptive 
stay of discovery applicable in private securities class actions under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act should be extended to all civil litigation). 
 193 See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say “No Fishing”: The Lure of 
Metaphor, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006). 
 194 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 26(g). 
 195 See Effron, supra note 10, at 2036-37; see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access 
to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 217, 277-78 (2007) [hereinafter Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery]. 
 196 This provision is discussed below. See infra notes 210-221 and accompanying text.  
1528 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4 
civil litigation,” there is “reason to believe . . . that lawyers and 
prospective claimants seek presuit discovery not superfluously, 
but as a tool for gathering information before suit on the limited 
occasions when such information is otherwise inaccessible to 
them through all other publicly available sources.”197 He thus 
concludes that “factors suggest that lawyers and prospective 
claimants in Texas, as in most jurisdictions, may be frequently 
motivated to gather factual information prior to suit in order to 
evaluate the legal and practical viability of filing and pursuing 
the claim to settlement or judgment,”198 not as a tool to pursue 
frivolous litigation.199 
4. Presuit Depositions: New Rule 27 
Currently, Rule 27 authorizes pre-litigation depositions,200 
and with a bit of tweaking the possibility of such discovery can be 
harnessed to respond to the new plausibility pleading mandate.201 
As a textual matter, Rule 27 is not clear about how widely 
available this discovery device is. Case law, however, firmly 
establishes that a Rule 27 pre-litigation deposition is available 
only in very limited circumstances when necessary to preserve 
testimony.202 Thus, as currently interpreted, Rule 27 is rarely a 
useful discovery device. 
The introduction of plausibility pleading provides a 
justification for reconsidering how accessible pre-litigation 
depositions should be. Perhaps the leading argument for strong 
limits on this procedural device is that it lacks a common law 
analog, and since the common law generally disallowed pre-
litigation discovery, Rule 27 should be interpreted in a manner 
faithful to the common law restriction.203 Now that Twombly and 
Iqbal have increased the pleading threshold, consequently 
making it harder to access discovery, a departure from the 
common law tradition against compelled pre-litigation discovery 
can be more easily justified on systemic grounds as a means of 
 
 197 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 266. 
 198 Id. at 269. 
 199 But see id. at 270 & n.151. 
 200 FED. R. CIV. P. 27. See generally Nicholas A. Kronfeld, Note, The Preservation 
and Discovery of Evidence Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27, 78 GEO. L.J. 593 (1990) 
(providing well-researched doctrinal account of Rule 27, paying careful historical attention 
to sources on which Advisory Committee’s proposed language was based). 
 201 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 86-88. 
 202 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 226-35; 
Kronfeld, supra note 200, at 602-03. 
 203 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 227-29; 
Kronfeld, supra note 200, at 605. 
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rebalancing the Rules. Reforming Rule 27 attacks a central 
problem with Twombly and Iqbal, namely difficulties created 
by the disjunction between their dislike and distrust of 
discovery and the pleading solution they applied to that 
concern. It would help plaintiffs avoid the discovery Catch-22 
that can result from plausibility pleading.204 
Arguing for more discovery, particularly a discovery device 
that is available before litigation even begins, is sure to be 
controversial given the persistent, hostile narrative against 
discovery. One response is to emphasize that there are endless 
options available to help assure that access to a new, expanded 
Rule 27 is properly limited. One option would be to create an 
entirely new type of action that is dedicated to litigating only one 
issue, namely whether a pre-litigation deposition should be 
allowed. To promote fairness and protect due process rights, this 
litigation should not be ex parte. Instead, notice should be provided 
to the deposition target and perhaps also to anticipated defendants. 
Procedural requirements can be imposed, such as requiring an 
affidavit explaining why the pre-litigation deposition is crucial to 
determining the viability of a traditional lawsuit. Other procedural 
constraints, such as a presumptive limit on the number of presuit 
depositions, can also be imposed consistent with already existing 
discovery limits on interrogatories and depositions.205 
5. State Approaches 
Numerous states provide avenues for limited pre-litigation 
discovery, in varying amounts. Many of these states used Rule 
27206 as their starting point, but chose to go further. These state 
approaches provide models for designing pre-litigation discovery 
in federal court as a means of protecting plaintiffs from the Catch-
22 that Twombly and Iqbal can create.207 
Consideration has already been given to the terms under 
which such an expanded discovery approach should be made 
available. After reviewing numerous state pre-litigation discovery 
models, Professor Hoffman has suggested the following ex ante 
standards, which require a petitioner to provide: 
 
 204 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 205 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 81; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
30(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (d)(1), 33(a)(1). 
 206 See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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(i) the subject matter of the anticipated action (when suit is 
anticipated) or the nature of the inquiry that prompts the petitioner 
to seek a deposition to investigate a potential claim; 
(ii) the petitioner’s interest in the subject matter of the deposition or 
other discovery; 
(iii) the parties whom the petitioner anticipates will have adverse 
interests; 
(iv) the substance of the testimony the petitioner expects to get from 
the deponent or the written information or documents sought; and, 
(v) the reason why the testimony, information, or documents are 
sought.208 
Professor Hoffman also suggests a sixth factor, namely that a 
petitioner must “demonstrate [that] the information he seeks 
cannot otherwise be obtained.”209 
Numerous state models that could be consulted about how 
to reform discovery in the federal district courts are set forth in 
the appendix. One such example comes from Texas. Texas Rule of 
Civil Procedure 202, which is entitled “Depositions Before Suit or 
to Investigate Claims,”210 provides “the broadest state grant of 
investigatory discovery to private parties.”211 It authorizes pre-
litigation petitions seeking either “to perpetuate . . . testimony . . . 
for use in an anticipated suit” or “to investigate a potential claim 
or suit.”212 The court “must order” a pre-litigation deposition if 
doing so “may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an 
anticipated suit” or where “the likely benefit . . . to investigate a 
potential claim outweighs the burden or expense of the 
procedure.”213 Professor Hoffman, who conducted a survey of 
Texas lawyers and judges about Texas Rule 202,214 reports that it 
“has been interpreted by courts as broadly as [its] language 
suggests.”215 Only about 20% of lawyers indicated that judges 
limited “the scope of the subject matter for the presuit deposition,” 
and slightly “under 9% reported that the judge limited the scope 
 
 208 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 274. 
 209 Id. 
 210 TEX. R. CIV. P. 202. 
 211 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 247. Professor 
Hoffman presents an informative history of Texas Rule 202. See id. at 241-45. 
 212 TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1. 
 213 TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a). One example of when the burden outweighs the benefit, 
and thus a petition for pre-litigation discovery can be denied, includes when trade secret 
information is sought. See In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 362 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 214 See Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 247-48; 
see also id. at 250-61 (reporting survey findings). 
 215 Id. at 245 & n.105. 
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of documents requested in connection with a Rule 202 petition 
and less than 5% reported that the judge did not allow the 
production of documents at all.”216 Judicial responses were 
consistent with broad access to pre-litigation discovery, though 
not as generous as the lawyers’ responses indicated. Judges 
responded that they limited “the scope of the subject matter . . . 
30% of the time; and the scope of documents to be produced was 
limited only 13% of the time” with “production of documents 
[being] entirely disallowed in 5 % of the cases.”217 
The possibility of using Texas Rule 202 to investigate 
whether a claim exists218 stands in stark contrast to the 
approach in most other states, which reject that use, instead 
generally limiting pre-litigation discovery where it exists to 
identification of proper defendants. Texas lawyers find this more 
liberal scope of pre-litigation discovery useful, indicating that 
roughly 60% of the time they use Texas Rule 202 to investigate 
whether a claim exists.219 Plaintiff-side lawyers who lobbied in 
favor of what became Texas Rule 202 had argued that such 
broad pre-litigation discovery would be useful for reducing non-
meritorious suits.220 Their position appears creditable, as 
Professor Hoffman’s data indicate that, when the court has 
denied pre-litigation discovery petitions, thus providing an extra 
warning about the merits of a case, plaintiffs filed actual 
lawsuits only about 17-34% of the time.221 
6. Comparative Approaches 
a. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom authorizes pre-litigation discovery.222 
The relevant rule requires an “application . . . supported by 
evidence,” and makes such discovery available when the parties 
at trial “likely” will be the same as those whose interests in the 
application are adverse; the respondent’s disclosure duty if an 
action had been initiated “would extend to the documents” as to 
which disclosure is sought; and pre-litigation disclosure “is 
 
 216 Id. at 259. 
 217 Id. 
 218 TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1(b). 
 219 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 254-55 & n.120. 
 220 Id. at 244. 
 221 Id. at 255. 
 222 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 77 n.139 (citing CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULES, 1998, Statutory Instrument 1998/3132, ¶ 31.16 (U.K.)). 
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desirable” in terms of fairness, to resolve the dispute without 
litigation, or to promote cost efficiency.223 
b. Victoria, Australia 
The Supreme Court in Victoria, Australia has adopted 
several rules authorizing pre-litigation discovery. One rule can be 
used to obtain limited discovery before commencing a lawsuit for 
the purpose of identifying the proper defendant.224 This provision 
is available where “reasonable inquiries” have been unavailing, 
and “it appears that some person has or is likely to have 
knowledge of facts, or has or is likely to have or has had or is 
likely to have had in that person’s possession any document or 
thing, tending to assist in such ascertainment.”225 In such a 
situation, the court may order attendance at a hearing for an oral 
examination, as well as document production.226 
Another rule permits pre-litigation discovery of a limited 
nature against a known defendant to confirm whether an action 
exists.227 This rule empowers a court to order document production 
against a “prospective defendant” if “there is reasonable cause to 
believe that” a cause of action exists; “after making all reasonable 
inquiries” insufficient information exists to determine “whether to 
commence a proceeding”; and there exists “reasonable cause to 
believe that” the prospective defendant “has or is likely to have 
or has had or is likely to have had in that person’s possession 
any document” pertaining to whether a cause of action exists.228 
7. Cost Shifting 
Cost shifting reforms provide another avenue for 
revamping our federal civil litigation system in response to 
plausibility pleading. Cost shifting is an intriguing idea for 
several reasons. Possible reforms range from minor to major, from 
those that constitute small responses to plausibility pleading, to 
those that hold the potential to significantly alter our civil 
litigation model—indeed, to an extent far beyond plausibility 
pleading itself. Additionally, cost shifting can be implemented in 
 
 223 Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, ¶ 31.16 (U.K.). 
 224 General Civil Procedure 2005 (Vic.) reg 32.03 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_reg/sccpr2005433/s32.03.html. 
 225 Id. reg. 32.03(1). 
 226 Id. reg. 32.03(2). 
 227 General Civil Procedure 2005 (Vic.) reg 32.05 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_reg/sccpr2005433/s32.05.html. 
 228 Id. 
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many different ways using many different tools. A few of the 
possibilities are presented below. 
a. Statutory Fees 
Statutory fees have long been used to accomplish 
substantive policy ends, such as to promote consumer protection 
actions229 as well as antitrust litigation230 and trademark 
protection.231 They could be used for a similar purpose to respond 
to plausibility pleading, providing a procedural mechanism 
that promotes the substantive policy end of protecting access to 
the courthouse. 
Statutory fees could be fashioned in many different 
permutations to accomplish this objective, such as being made 
available for pre-litigation discovery. For example, Congress could 
establish a statutory fee that a federal trial judge could grant to a 
prospective plaintiff if pre-litigation discovery was obstructed 
without merit, or in bad faith, or to a prospective defendant 
subjected to pre-litigation discovery but where no complaint was 
filed within a defined period.232 Depending upon how Congress 
designed the statutory fee structure, it could accomplish various 
policy goals, such as encouraging or discouraging resort to pre-
litigation discovery, minimizing litigation concerning entitlement 
to the statutory fee, or establishing the degree of judicial 
discretion on a statutory fee award. 
b. American Rule 
Another cost shifting option is to alter our adherence to 
the American Rule, under which each party generally bears its 
own litigation costs, including its own attorney fees and discovery 
costs.233 The American Rule might be partially altered by, for 
example, requiring plaintiffs to reimburse the responding party’s 
 
 229 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (2012); Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). 
 230 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (authorizing treble damages). 
 231 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(c)-(d). 
 232 Congress could also consider making statutory fees available for discovery in 
general, though doing so would likely be too problematic given the concern that such fees 
could become yet another source for litigation. Such concerns could certainly apply to 
statutory fees applicable to pre-litigation discovery, but should not be of a comparable 
magnitude given that pre-litigation discovery will presumably be quite limited. 
 233 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); see also 
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, supra note 68, at 31 n.146; Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, supra note 141, at 452. The primary exception is taxation of routine 
costs, which are normally modest and which Congress has both defined and authorized. 
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (2012). 
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costs for pre-litigation discovery or any limited discovery before a 
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. A broader approach might require, or at least create the 
potential for, each side to pay all or part of the discovery costs it 
imposes upon the other side. The Advisory Committee has 
embraced this reform through a proposed amendment to 
discovery Rule 26(c)(1)(B) that expressly grants courts the power 
to include “the allocation of expenses” into protective orders, 
which is well on its way to becoming law.234 
Allowing departures from the American Rule with 
regard to discovery costs has the significant advantage—absent 
in our current system—of forcing a party that seeks discovery 
to internalize the responding party’s costs.235 Should this 
reform be pursued, Professor Dodson’s suggestions—that 
discovery cost shifting against plaintiffs should be rejected 
when they locate “evidence of culpability,” or if the responding 
party “stonewalls proper discovery requests”236—should be 
incorporated. Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee proposal 
omits any such safeguards beyond stating in the relevant 
Committee Note that “[r]ecognizing the authority does not 
imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice. 
Courts and parties should continue to assume that a 
responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”237 
c. Bonds 
Cost shifting can also be accomplished by imposing bond 
requirements for accessing pre-litigation discovery, though this 
option should be carefully considered given potential problems 
with it.238 Professor Dodson has suggested that what he calls 
“New Discovery”—a reformed discovery regime that responds 
to plausibility pleading239—“could include a presumptive rule 
 
 234 See Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10, 34 (June 14, 2014), in SUMMARY 
OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 34, at app. B-10, B34; see also supra note 35. 
 235 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 82. 
 236 Id. at 83. 
 237 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25, in 
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 34, at app. B-45. 
 238 See Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 111, at 572-76 (explaining 
that bonding can reduce frivolous litigation by imposing costs but can skew outcomes in 
an undesirable way). 
 239 See Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 55. 
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that the plaintiff bears the burden of all New Discovery costs, 
perhaps enforced through a bond requirement.”240 
As with other reform possibilities, numerous options exist 
for how to implement a bond requirement. The bond amount 
would have to be set. It could be linked to the scope of litigation, 
such as by setting it at a percentage of damages sought,241 or in 
relation to an estimated cost of pre-litigation discovery. A party 
prevailing against the plaintiff could be authorized to proceed 
against the plaintiff’s bond to recoup discovery costs. Since bond 
requirements act to discourage litigation, ideally one would be 
paired with a counterincentive that rewards litigation, such as 
establishing a regime under which a prevailing plaintiff is 
reimbursed for all or part of its discovery costs, such as through 
alteration of the American Rule.242 
B. Non-Discovery Reform Options 
It is possible to address plausibility pleading’s Catch-22 
discovery problems243 through non-discovery mechanisms. I 
discuss a few below. 
1. New Rule 12(e): Reinvigorate Motion for More 
Definite Statement 
Twombly and Iqbal call for disregarding conclusory 
allegations,244 but the manner in which they do so is one of the 
most criticized aspects of the new plausibility pleading regime 
they introduced. While such a blackletter rule has long existed,245 
there is a widespread belief that Twombly and Iqbal applied it in 
a new way that will result in unpredictable and inconsistent 
 
 240 Id. at 82. 
 241 This would only work when damages are for a stated sum certain, which is 
not required in federal court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3); 27 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, 
LAWYERS EDITION § 62:59 (2008). 
 242 See supra Part III.A.7.b (discussing American Rule). 
 243 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 244 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555, 557, 564 & n.9 (2007); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading 
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298-99, 1314-15 (2010). 
 245 See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34(1)(b) 
(3d ed. 2009); 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2011). But see Clermont & Yeazell, supra 
note 7, at 836 & nn.52-53 (contending that Rules, forms, and case law often allowed 
conclusory allegations). 
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application,246 aggrandizing judicial discretion at the cost of 
dismissing some meritorious claims.247 
One response to this new pleading regime is to more 
frequently invoke Rule 12(e), which requires plaintiffs to provide 
a more definite statement in their complaints,248 especially with 
regard to those conclusory allegations that Twombly and Iqbal 
require to be disregarded. This is especially justified given the 
new manner in which these cases treat conclusory allegations. 
Iqbal uses the conclusory concept not in its traditional manner—
when “the allegations track formulaic language” merely reciting 
the elements of a claim—but instead to identify the pleading as 
“stat[ing] facts at too high a level of generality.”249 In response, a 
court could rule on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by demanding a more 
definite statement under Rule 12(e) (while perhaps holding the 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion in abeyance).250 Doing so will alert a 
plaintiff to a need to provide greater factual detail so as to 
satisfy the new plausibility pleading standard, and provide the 
opportunity to do so. 
This approach, however, is far from ideal. The biggest 
problem with plausibility pleading is the impact it will have on 
cases in which information asymmetry exists between the 
parties.251 Where a plaintiff lacks access to the information 
necessary to provide greater factual specificity, a Rule 12(e) more 
definite statement ruling will most likely make no difference 
because the plaintiff has no means of gaining access to the needed 
information. Thus, this reform promises to make little difference 
if implemented on its own. It will be a meaningful reform only if 
implemented along with others, particularly discovery reforms 
responsive to plausibility pleading—of the kinds discussed 
 
 246 Unsurprisingly, for example, there is no agreement among courts about 
whether general allegations of discriminatory intent or defendant’s knowledge are 
conclusory. Compare Jones v. Hashagen, No. 4:09-CV-887, 2010 WL 128316, at *4 (M.D. 
Pa. Jan. 12, 2010) (conclusory), and Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. 
Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1201-02 (N.D. Cal. 2009), with Santiago v. Walls, 
599 F.3d 749, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2010) (not conclusory), and EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C 
4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 247 See, e.g., Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 867-70; Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 7, at 837-38, 840-42; Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 60-61; 
Miller, supra note 71, at 25-26; Schneider, supra note 7, at 530, 544-45. But see Hartnett, 
supra note 8, at 498-503; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
1063, 1089-91 (2009); Steinman, supra note 244, at 1316, 1334-39. 
 248 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). 
 249 Bone, Comment on Iqbal, supra note 7, at 860; see also Dodson, New Discovery, 
supra note 10, at 61 (“nonconclusoriness requires some meaningful factual grounding”). 
 250 See, e.g., Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1083 & n.6 (11th Cir. 
1996); Bouknight v. Dist. of Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 251 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
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above252—that will provide tools a plaintiff can use in an attempt 
to redress the identified pleading deficiency. 
2. Context-Specific Heightened Pleading—The Rule 9(b) 
Paradigm 
Rather than altering pleading doctrine through judicial fiat, 
as occurred in Twombly and Iqbal, a better option is to do so 
through the Rules Enabling Act process by requiring heightened 
pleading for specific types of cases. Rule 9(b) already provides for 
context-specific heightened pleading for fraud actions.253 Professors 
Clermont and Yeazell have suggested pursuing this option, writing 
that one possibility is to “revise Rule 9 to include more classes of 
cases, while abrogating Twombly and Iqbal as a general rule.”254 
The Advisory Committee has echoed their suggestion.255 
Another way to accomplish the same end is to alter 
pleading standards through legislation, as Congress has shown 
some interest in doing to abrogate Twombly and Iqbal,256 and 
as it has done in securities law257 and in connection with the 
Y2K scare.258 
C. Fundamental Changes Toward New Discovery Models 
Addressing the discovery concerns that animated Twombly 
and Iqbal can be accomplished through highly innovative 
initiatives that fall outside of traditional discovery reforms. Some of 
these could significantly alter our litigation system. I present 
several possibilities below. 
 
 252 See supra Part III.A. 
 253 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 254 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 854 & n.121. 
 255 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 6 (2010) (explaining that one option for 
responding to plausibility pleading “is to expand on the categories of claims flagged for 
‘heightened pleading’ by Rule 9(b)” and noting that “[t]wo of the categories often 
mentioned . . . are claims of conspiracy and actions that involve official immunity”). 
 256 See supra note 175. 
 257 See The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
4(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) (2012) (imposing heightened pleading requirements on securities fraud 
actions); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
 258 See Dodson, Comparative Pleading, supra note 8, at 456 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6607(b)-(d)). 
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1. Use of Discovery Neutral: Toward an Inquisitorial 
System? 
Continuing along the continuum that spans a purely 
adversarial litigation system and a purely inquisitorial one leads to 
another discovery reform that merits consideration, which is to 
take partial control of discovery away from the parties and give it 
to a neutral.259 This, of course, is far from a new proposal.260 In the 
federal district court system, federal magistrates261 are well placed 
to perform these additional duties, though at present they likely 
lack the necessary resources to do so. Federal magistrates already 
play important roles in discovery, with many federal judges 
delegating to them the primary responsibility of overseeing 
discovery.262 This reform option, though dramatic in the sense of 
moving us further toward an inquisitorial system, is best described 
as innovative rather than revolutionary in the sense that it merely 
continues our evolution toward giving the judiciary increased case 
management responsibilities while decreasing party control in 
litigation.263 Another option is to use special masters.264 
One concern about this reform is that the neutral might be 
given inadequate power to actually change the discovery dynamic, 
and thus would simply constitute an ineffective, additional 
bureaucratic office. To mitigate this concern, the neutral could be 
given the power, and perhaps duty, to issue a report and 
 
 259 This reform could be adopted as a complement to judicial screening, a reform 
that Professor Bone has suggested for reducing the possibility of frivolous litigation. See 
Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 111, at 593-96. 
 260 E.g., Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, supra note 28, at 644-45. 
 261 Federal magistrate positions are statutory creations. Federal Magistrates 
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968). 
 262 See Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s 
The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1989); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(A) (2012); David A. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the 
Hands of Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433, 457 (1997). The Rule drafters 
themselves initially contemplated that “possibly it [would be] desirable” to have 
magistrates (or some other neutral, such as a master) closely oversee discovery to protect 
against abuse. Subrin, History of Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 56, at 717 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 263 See generally Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power 
in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 63-75 (1995) (reviewing 
techniques that federal trial courts have used to increase judicial case management); Judith 
Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). One notable trend since the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 is their persistent amendment to 
authorize greater judicial oversight of litigation, including with regard to discovery. See 
Kessler, supra note 11, at 1191-92; e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes 1983 
and 1993 amendments. 
 264 David R. Cohen, E-Discovery Special Masters Slash Costs in Pennsylvania, 
CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://autonomy.corporatecounsel.law.com/e-discovery-
special-masters-slash-costs-in-pennsylvania/.  
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recommendation at a litigation’s end about the extent to which 
each party satisfied its discovery obligations and acted in good 
faith, findings that could be linked to the potential for the 
shifting, in whole or in part, of discovery costs.265 
A great obstacle to using magistrates as neutrals is the 
adequacy of magistrate resources. As Professor Kessler has 
explained, movement toward an inquisitorial model comes with 
costs because such a system requires a larger bureaucracy than 
currently exists in our judiciary, which is modeled primarily on an 
adversarial system.266 Depending on the scope of this reform, new 
investments could range from additional magistrates, additional 
support staff, additional office space and logistical support, etc. 
All of this costs money, which will be a major stumbling block, in 
addition to the political and philosophical battle over whether it is 
advisable to move further toward an inquisitorial system.267 
2. E-Discovery Liaisons 
The U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has been 
conducting an Electronic Discovery Pilot Program,268 and one of 
its recommendations, the use of e-discovery liaisons,269 is a 
promising discovery reform. This is particularly so given that 
traditional concerns about discovery—burdens, costs, difficulties 
of compliance, and gaming opportunities—are magnified in the 
e-discovery context.270 In 2009, the Seventh Circuit appointed a 
committee to study e-discovery.271 “The pilot program was 
designed to develop and test principles aimed at decreasing the 
expense, burden, and time of e-discovery in modern litigation.”272 
 
 265 The possibility of cost-shifting reforms in discovery is discussed above. See 
supra notes 229-242 and accompanying text. 
 266 Kessler, supra note 11, at 1221-23, 1253-54 & n.373, 1270-71. 
 267 For an argument in favor of moving further toward an inquisitorial system, 
particularly with regard to discovery, see Kessler, supra note 11, at 1260, 1270-73. 
 268 The Seventh Circuit has established a website for the program at 
www.discoverypilot.com. 
 269 See Marc Gottridge et al., Practical Principles for E-Discovery in the 21st 
Century: Phase One Results of the Seventh Circuit’s Electronic Discovery Pilot Program, 
78 U.S.L.W. 2679, 2680 (May 18, 2010). 
 270 See ACTL/IAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2; Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et 
al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790-91 (2010). 
 271 See SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: REPORT ON 
PHASE ONE MAY 20, 2009—MAY 1, 2010 at 1 (2010), http://www.discoverypilot.com/
sites/default/files/phase1report.pdf. 
 272 Gottridge, supra note 269, at 2679. 
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The Seventh Circuit program required each party to 
appoint its own e-discovery liaison.273 The liaison could be “an 
attorney (in-house or outside counsel), a third party consultant, 
or an employee of the party”274 or, actually, anyone else. What 
was critical was not the liaison’s identity but the liaison’s 
competence and authority. As envisioned in the Seventh Circuit 
project, “an e-discovery liaison must”: 
(a) be prepared to participate in e-discovery dispute resolution; 
(b) be knowledgeable about the party’s e-discovery efforts; 
(c) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, familiar with the 
party’s electronic systems and capabilities in order to explain those 
systems and answer relevant questions; and 
(d) be, or have reasonable access to those who are, knowledgeable 
about the technical aspects of e-discovery, including electronic document 
storage, organization, and format issues, and relevant information 
retrieval technology, including search methodology.275 
Thus, for example, a large corporation, which might have 
sufficient internal information technology knowledge, could 
appoint an information technology staff member as the liaison 
to work with counsel.276 
The idea for e-discovery liaisons holds promise because the 
Seventh Circuit’s initial evaluation of this reform indicates that 
both judges and practitioners considered it to be very helpful.277 
These positive findings continued through the pilot program’s 
most recent report, which covered the period through May 2013.278 
Importantly, there is abundant opportunity to tailor this reform 
to address policy concerns. Concerns about the additional costs 
that e-discovery liaisons would impose could be addressed by 
making the naming of liaisons optional rather than mandatory; or 
clarifying that e-discovery liaisons are mandatory only for certain 
cases, such as large cases meeting a high damages threshold; or 
creating a presumption that small cases are exempt from any 
liaison mandate. 
 
 273 SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: REPORT ON 
PHASE ONE MAY 20, 2009—MAY 1, 2010, supra note 271, at 5. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. at 12-13. 
 276 Gottridge, supra note 269, at 2682. 
 277 Id. at 2681. 
 278 See SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM: INTERIM 
REPORT ON PHASE THREE MAY 2012—MAY 2013 at 1 (2013), http://www.discoverypilot.com/
sites/default/files/phase_three_interim_report.pdf. 
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Particularly if e-discovery liaisons were made mandatory, 
even if only for certain categories of cases, adoption of this 
reform could become sufficiently widespread as to contribute to 
the continued creation of an entire new industry, essentially an 
industry of independent “e-discovery experts” with specialized 
knowledge in the law (to competently advise and consult on the 
procedural and legal aspect of e-discovery issues or disputes) and 
technology (to competently advise and consult on technological 
e-discovery issues). Market forces could be harnessed to respond 
to this need, which could lead to new specializations for 
attorneys who combine legal knowledge with technical expertise, 
or to new firms that employ attorneys and information 
technology specialists, all of whom work in tandem to provide 
e-discovery services. 
3. Discovery ADR 
Another possible discovery reform that could also lead to 
the creation of a new industry, or the significant expansion of 
an existing one, is to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms, probably either arbitration or mediation, to help 
resolve discovery disputes.279 ADR has flourished in large 
measure due to its promise to reduce the costs and delays that 
exist in litigation. Attempts could be made to extend that 
promise by using ADR to reduce the costs and delays that can 
occur during discovery. 
An advantage of this approach, especially if it leverages 
existing court-connected ADR opportunities,280 is that it could 
likely be implemented at a lower cost than embracing a new, 
expanded role for federal magistrates (an option discussed 
above281). If nothing else, reduced overhead costs might be 
expected, as ADR efforts could occur in existing free space in 
courthouses or in existing space at the firms of either party 
counsel or ADR professionals. Lower costs might also be expected 
because this effort could benefit from an existing labor force, as 
many courts already use court-connected ADR and have a 
plentiful supply of lawyers and non-attorney ADR professionals to 
do it. Some additional costs would likely be incurred in providing 
new and relevant training so that these ADR efforts would be 
effective in addressing discovery concerns, but likely these costs 
 
 279 See Cohen, supra note 264 (recounting that panels of e-discovery special 
masters are available to act as discovery mediators). 
 280 See Kessler, supra note 11, at 1191 & n.43. 
 281 See infra notes 259-267 and accompanying text. 
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would pale in comparison to the costs that would be incurred in 
moving farther along toward an inquisitorial system through, for 
example, an increase in the ranks of federal magistrates. 
4. Private FOIA Rights 
Freedom of information (FOI) rights in public 
information, which allow private parties to demand access to 
information that the government holds, are a common legal 
feature of many government systems.282 FOI regimes have been 
rapidly expanding, with a 2006 review reporting that 66 countries 
had passed some form of FOI legislation.283 Though often such 
regimes are weak and inadequate, with even the best often being 
criticized as ineffectual, they do raise an interesting question 
about informational transparency: are there any circumstances in 
which the interests promoted by governmental transparency are 
sufficiently similar to those promoted by private transparency 
that similar transparency regimes can be justified in both realms? 
Informational transparency advocates have argued that 
FOI rights should extend beyond the government, to all entities 
that receive public funding, including nonprofit organizations, 
private companies, contractors, and foundations, as well as to any 
entity that carries out a function of public interest, such as private 
hospitals, schools, and prisons.284 Indeed, numerous examples exist 
of nations deciding that FOI rights should be extended against at 
least some private entities. Denmark’s FOI laws apply mostly to 
public bodies, but a unique clause extends coverage to private 
energy suppliers.285 The Dominican Republic’s law on access to 
information allows the public to seek information from both 
governmental and private organizations that receive public 
money.286 In Estonia, FOI laws cover all “holders of information,” 
including various species of the private sector that carry out public 
 
 282 See Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 246. 
 283 John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of 
Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 85 (2006); see also Lydia Polgreen, 
Right-to-Know Law Gives India’s Poor a Lever, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at A1. 
 284 See Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 99; see also Patrick 
Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 215 (2006) (“FOI is a subject that will have to be addressed to global 
corporations because of their power to act like governments and to dominate national 
governments and regional governance.”). 
 285 The Danish Access to Public Administrations Files Act (Act No. 572, 19 Dec. 
1985), available at http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6833. 
 286 Ley No. 200-04, Ley General de Libre Acceso a la Información Pública (2006) 
(D.R.), available at http://digeig.gob.do/j/images/docs/Ley20004.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
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duties such as in health care and education.287 Finland’s FOI laws 
were amended in 1999 to extend the transparency principle to 
corporations that perform public duties, including pension funds.288 
The United Kingdom’s FOI laws extend discretionary coverage to 
private organizations when those businesses are performing 
“functions of a public nature.”289 
An even broader regime exists in South Africa, where FOI 
rights are actually enshrined in the constitution and can extend 
to private entities regardless of whether they receive public funds 
or perform public functions. “South African FOI law stands out in 
its blanket application to all ‘bodies’ in both the public and private 
sectors.”290 The South African Constitution includes a Bill of 
Rights, of which section 32 states: 
Access to Information 
(1) Everyone has the right of access to 
(a) any information held by the state; and 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that 
is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, 
and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the 
administrative and financial burden on the state.291 
This approach is designed to promote the public interest through 
protection of citizens’ rights, not only from dangers emanating 
from governmental secrecy,292 but also from private interests as 
well.293 Coverage is not dependent upon receipt of public funds or 
performance of public functions. Rather, the underlying philosophy 
 
 287 Public Information Act of 2000 (Est.), available at http://www.legislationline.org/
en/topics/country/33/topic/3. 
 288 Act on the Openness of Government (Act No, 621/1999) (Fin.), available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990621.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 289 Freedom of Information Act, 2000, c. 36 § 5(1)(a) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/pdfs/ukpga_20000036_en.pdf. 
 290 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 111 (citation omitted). 
 291 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 32, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/
legislation/acts/1996-108.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 292 See Birkinshaw, supra note 284, at 213 (explaining that FOI as a fundamental 
human right “is based upon protect[ing] . . . individuals against one-sided, deceitful, 
inefficient, oppressive, arbitrary, cowardly, and bullying government,” while noting that 
South Africa bases its FOI approach upon constitutionalism); see also Ackerman & 
Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 118 (recounting that United States FOI Act was 
implemented in part to empower Congress against the secretive executive branch). 
 293 See Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 100 (opining 
that clause (1)(b) of the South African FOI constitutional provision “is the most 
important, since it requires private corporations and nonprofit organizations to follow 
transparency laws as well.”). 
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is that any privately-held information belongs to the public so long 
as it has a “‘demonstrable and sufficient connection to the exercise 
or protection of any rights.’”294 The burden lies on the information 
holder, even when a private entity, to establish why it is justified 
in non-disclosure.295 
In 2000, South Africa implemented the legislation called 
for in clause 2, making South Africa’s constitutional right of 
access to information enforceable through the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act (PAIA).296 Consistent with clause (1)(b)’s broad 
mandate of private transparency, the PAIA “provides an 
individual right of access to information in private hands, where 
that information relates to the exercise or protection of rights . . . 
[and] permits the state to exercise the right of access to 
information in private hands.”297 This extension of FOI rights 
against private entities can be justified on the basis that private 
companies can abuse both power and individual rights in the 
same way as a corrupt government can.298 
In contrast to the regimes discussed above, the United 
States’ approach to its FOI regime is quite crabbed. In the United 
States, FOI laws apply only against governmental agencies, and 
do not even include public bodies such as “Congress, the courts, or 
the White House Chief Counsel”; “private bodies and contractors 
that receive public monies”; or entities that perform public 
functions like prison management or overseeing prison 
conditions.299 These omissions are increasingly controversial given 
the particularly American trend toward privatization, in which the 
federal government delegates public tasks to private corporations, 
nonprofit organizations, independent contractors, and quasi-
governmental entities.300 Other important limiting factors include 
that obtaining information in the United States under its FOI 
 
 294 Birkinshaw, supra note 284, at 215-16 (quoting IAIN CURRIE & JONATHAN 
KLAAREN, THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT COMMENTARY 19 (2002)). 
 295 Id. 
 296 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (S. Afr.) (2000); see also 
Phoebe Bolton, The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics, 
37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 781, 784 (2008). 
 297 Birkinshaw, supra note 284, at 215. 
 298 See id. 
 299 Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 100, 110; see, e.g., 
Abbott v. Trog, No. 2:09CV00015, 2010 WL 199909, *8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2010) (denying 
records pertaining to bunk and cell assignments at a county jail because defendants were 
not federal agencies subject to FOIA); Goddard v. Whitmer, No. 09-CV-404-JMH, 2010 
WL 116744, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 6 2010) (rejecting document request seeking allegations 
of judicial bias because federal courts are not subject to FOIA); Tyree v. Hope Village, 
Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 109, 110 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that a privately run half-way 
house is “not an agency subject to . . . the FOIA”). 
 300 See Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 283, at 123. 
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laws is often expensive, and in addition the processing time can 
be lengthy, in part because United States law sets no firm time 
limits for responses.301 
CONCLUSION 
In Twombly and Iqbal, bare Supreme Court majorities 
unwisely adopted plausibility pleading—thereby revolutionizing 
pleading doctrine—as a response to perceived discovery problems. 
That choice was regrettable. It was inadvisable, incomplete, and 
imprudent, improperly aggrandizing judicial power at the cost of 
the well-established Rules Enabling Act rulemaking process, 
which provides the preferable method for revising the Rules in 
general and pleading and discovery rules in particular. 
Recently, and post-Twombly and Iqbal, the Advisory 
Committee has invoked the Rules Enabling Act process to reform 
discovery. It has chosen a strategy of generally limiting discovery. 
This choice is particularly unfortunate because, in response to 
plausibility pleading, what is needed is an expansion in the range 
of discovery options so as to promote better-tailored discovery. 
More discovery options can lead to less discovery in the aggregate 
by providing more tools for customizing discovery to the needs of a 
given case, and in that way respond to the discovery concerns that 
troubled the Twombly and Iqbal majorities. Reforming discovery 
in this way is consistent with the views of those procedural 
reformers who succeeded in implementing the Rules. Those 
reformers wanted flexibility in transsubstantive rules so as to 
“make it possible to tailor procedures to the requirements of 
each case in a ‘rational’ way,”302 and presumed that the Rules 
would be “continually changed and improved.”303 A noble goal 
motivated these reformers: to maximize the rate at which cases 
were resolved in accordance with their underlying merit, rather 
than for other technical reasons. Plausibility pleading strikes 
at the heart of that goal. It would be shameful if plausibility 
pleading were allowed to subvert this goal for no other reason 
than a lack of imagination. 
 
 301 Id. at 107 & n.109-10. The United States FOIA provides a 20-day period for a 
covered agency to decide how to respond to the request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
However, no firm timeline exists for production of the requested information, which need 
only be provided “promptly.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012). 
 302 Bone, Mapping Dispute Boundaries, supra note 63, at 79; see also Subrin, 
Adjusting “One Size Fits All,” supra note 56, at 394. 
 303 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 304 (1938). 
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This article has attempted to show that discovery reforms 
offer a better response to any discovery problems that animated 
Twombly and Iqbal than does plausibility pleading, and to show 
that the range of such discovery reforms is limited only by our 
imagination. If discovery abuse is the problem—certainly a valid 
concern if it exists—then reforming discovery is a much more 
appropriate response than imposing an entirely novel pleading 
doctrine through judicial edict.304 
APPENDIX 
Below are numerous state models that could be plumbed for 
ideas about how to reform discovery in the federal district courts. 
STATE DISCOVERY MODELS 
I. ALABAMA 
Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 27, which is partly 
modeled on Rule 27,305 is entitled “Discovery Before Action or 
Pending Appeal” and authorizes the filing in state court of 
verified petitions seeking depositions, discovery of documents and 
things, or physical and mental examinations of persons,306 so long 
as the purpose is to perpetuate testimony.307 Alabama Rule 27 
mandates that such petitions must show (1) an inability to bring a 
cognizable action; (2) “the subject matter of the expected action 
and the petitioner’s interest” in it; (3) the facts the petitioner 
wishes to establish, and why; (4) names or descriptions, as well as 
known addresses, of expected adverse parties; and (5) names and 
addresses of “persons to be examined” and the substance of their 
expected testimony.308 
II. CONNECTICUT 
Similar to Alabama’s approach, Connecticut state law 
authorizes the filing of a verified petition seeking pre-litigation 
 
 304 See Steinman, supra note 244, at 1312-13 (agreeing that, if plausibility 
pleading is implemented as a new, heightened pleading standard, discovery reform would 
have been a better alternative route). 
 305 Ex Parte Anderson, 644 So. 2d 961, 963 (Ala. 1994), overruled by Ex parte 
Ferrari, Nos. 1130679 & 1130726, 2015 WL 480890, *17-18 (Ala. Feb. 6, 2015). 
 306 ALA. R. CIV. P. 27, 34, 35. 
 307 Ex parte Ferrari, 2015 WL 480890, at *9-18. 
 308 ALA. R. CIV. P. 27; see Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 77. 
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discovery,309 though the particulars differ. The Connecticut 
statute appears to presumptively limit such discovery to written 
interrogatories (unavailable in Alabama)310 or oral depositions, 
each solely to perpetuate testimony.311 The Connecticut statute 
empowers Connecticut courts to “make orders for the production 
of documents and things and the entry upon land for inspection 
and other purposes, and for the physical or mental examination of 
persons.”312 In Connecticut, such discovery is available through a 
“bill of discovery,” which is an independent equitable discovery 
action.313 A “petitioner must demonstrate that what he seeks to 
discover is material and necessary for proof of, or is needed to aid 
in proof of or in defense of, another action already brought or 
about to be brought,” and that there is “no other adequate means 
of enforcing discovery of the desired material.”314 To avoid 
unwarranted intrusions, discovery is limited to facts “material to 
the plaintiff’s cause of action,” and petitioner must “demonstrate 
good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is 
both material and necessary to his action” and provide as much 
detail about the material sought as is “reasonably available.”315 The 
probable cause standard can require presentation of evidence.316 
Use of the probable cause standard is interesting because, if carried 
over into the federal civil litigation context, it provides a 
conceptual safeguard against abusive discovery while benefiting 
from extensive federal court experience with probable cause in the 
Fourth Amendment context.317 
III. FLORIDA 
“Florida courts . . . recognize a prospective party’s right to 
bring an equitable bill of discovery . . . to determine the proper 
party to sue or to gather additional factual information.”318 This 
authority emanates from Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.290, 
which is entitled “Depositions Before Action or Pending 
 
 309 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-156(a). 
 310 Ex parte Ferrari, 2015 WL 480890, at *8-9. 
 311 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-156(a)(1), (3). 
 312 Id. § 52-156(a)(3). 
 313 Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994); Dodson, New Discovery, 
supra note 10, at 77-78. 
 314 Berger, 644 A.2d at 337 (citation omitted). 
 315 Id. (citations omitted). 
 316 See Cadle Co. v. Drubner, 777 A.2d 1286, 1288-89 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). 
 317 Cf. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 7, at 855-56 (proposing discovery 
gatekeeping mechanism by drawing analogy to search warrant issued on probable cause). 
 318 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 239. 
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Appeal.”319 Rule 1.290 is “patterned closely after Federal Rule 
27.”320 The drafters of Rule 1.290 indicated that it 
is intended only for the perpetuation of testimony; it is not a 
discovery procedure. It is not to be used for the purpose of discovery 
before action is commenced. A party may not “fish” for some ground 
for bringing suit. The requirement that the petitioner be presently 
unable to bring his action or cause it to be brought does not 
encompass the situation of a petitioner who has a matured claim but 
lacks knowledge of all the facts.321 
The procedure is commenced by filing a verified petition, which 
must address the same five factors as required in Alabama 
Rule 27.322 
The leading Florida Supreme Court case explains that an equitable 
bill of discovery under state law “lies to obtain the disclosure of facts 
within the defendant’s knowledge, or deeds or writings or other 
things in his custody, in aid of the prosecution or defense of an action 
pending or about to be commenced in some other court.”323 
By statute, Florida also has a mandatory “complex presuit 
investigation procedure” for medical malpractice cases,324 as a 
result of “the insistence of the defense bar.”325 The statutes, 
contained in chapter 766,326 require adverse parties facing 
potential litigation to cooperate in “informal discovery,”327 “under 
penalty of sanctions.”328 Such informal discovery can be quite 
extensive, including unsworn statements, documents or things, 
physical and mental examinations, and written questions.329 
 
 319 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.290. 
 320 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.290, authors’ comment 1967. For more on Federal Rule 27, 
see supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text. 
 321 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.290, authors’ comment 1967; see also Hoffman, Presuit 
Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 239 (“Florida courts have rarely exercised the 
full scope of such authority, however, finding that the equitable bill may not be used to 
investigate potential claims, only to gather information in support of claims already 
known to the prospective plaintiff.”). 
 322 FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.290(a)(1); cf. supra text accompanying note 308 (listing five 
factors required under Alabama Rule 27). 
 323 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 239 (quoting 
First Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Dade-Broward Co., 171 So. 510, 510-11 (Fla. 1937)). 
 324 FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (2014); Florida Hosp. Waterman v. Stoll, 855 So. 2d 271, 
276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). See generally Musculoskeletal Inst. Chartered v. Parham, 745 
So. 2d 946, 948-51 (Fla. 1999); Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla. 1996). 
 325 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 75. 
 326 FLA. STAT. §§ 766.104(1), (3), 766.106(3), (5)-(7), 766.204-.205. 
 327 Id. § 766.104(1). 
 328 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 75. 
 329 FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6) (2014). 
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IV. ILLINOIS 
Illinois authorizes an independent pre-litigation discovery 
action to identify proper defendants.330 Such discovery is available 
through the filing of a verified petition, and only upon leave of the 
court.331 The rule’s text requires that the petition explain “the 
reason the proposed discovery is necessary” and “the nature of the 
discovery sought.”332 One intermediate appellate court has ruled 
that “the petition must be verified”; “state [ ]  with particularity 
facts . . . establish[ing] a cause of action”; “seek [ ]  only the 
identity of the potential defendant and no other information 
necessary to establish the cause of action”; and be “subjected to a 
hearing” so the court can determine that the petition “sufficiently 
states a cause of action . . . against the unnamed potential 
defendant.”333 The discovery available includes depositions.334 
V. NEW YORK 
New York provides for pre-litigation discovery “to aid in 
bringing an action, to preserve information or to aid in 
arbitration . . . but only by court order.”335 Before obtaining such an 
order, New York courts have required petitioners to “demonstrate 
that [they] already possess [ ]  a cause of action.”336 Petitioners must 
also show that “the information sought is material and necessary to 
the actionable wrong.”337 These restrictions are used to limit access 
to this pre-litigation discovery device. 
[T]he courts in New York have interpreted the language in the state 
rule narrowly to preclude prospective plaintiffs from using presuit 
discovery to “fish” around to see if they have a legal claim to assert. 
Thus, even though section 3102 could be read even more expansively, 
the courts have attempted to limit the rule so that it may not be used to 
investigate whether a cause of action exists, to confirm the proper party 
 
 330 ILL. S. CT. R. 224(a)(1)(i) (providing that independent discovery action is available 
“for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in damages”). 
Discovery under this rule is unavailable where “the identity of any potential defendant is 
already known.” Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Ill. App. 2010). 
 331 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(1)(ii) & committee comments Aug. 1, 1989. 
 332 Id. 224(a)(1)(ii). 
 333 Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 673. 
 334 See ILL. S. CT. R. 224(a)(1)(ii). 
 335 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinney 2011). 
 336 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 238. 
 337 Holzman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 707 
N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (App. Div. 2000). 
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to sue, or to supplement factual allegations regarding a claim already 
known to exist.338 
New York courts thus guard against § 3102 being used to pursue 
a fishing expedition to determine if a case exists.339 Instead, it 
can only be used “to preserve evidence” for a claim already 
known to exist, or “to identify potential defendants.”340 
VI. OHIO 
Under Ohio Civil Procedure Rule 34(d)(1), “a person who 
claims to have a potential cause of action may file a petition to 
obtain discovery.”341 Commentary to Rule 34(d) indicates that it 
was intended to provide an opportunity “to determine the identity 
of a potential adverse party,” to “provide [ ]  a mechanism for a 
party who may have a cause of action to ascertain the identity of 
potential defendants” prior to filing suit.342 The intent was to 
“promote [ ]  efficiency, avoid [ ]  the joining of unnecessary 
defendants, and reduce [ ]  the time and expense of identifying 
those parties who may ultimately be liable for damages.”343 
Before resorting to such a petition, the party seeking 
information “shall make reasonable efforts to obtain voluntarily 
the information from the person from whom the discovery is 
sought.”344 If that effort is unavailing, the information can be 
pursued through a petition filed with the court, which “shall 
include all of the following”: 
(a) A statement of the subject matter of the petitioner’s potential 
cause of action and the petitioner’s interest in the potential cause of 
action; 
(b) A statement of the efforts made by the petitioner to obtain 
voluntarily the information from the person from whom the 
discovery is sought; 
(c) A statement or description of the information sought to be 
discovered with reasonable particularity; 
(d) The names and addresses, if known, of any person the petitioner 
expects will be an adverse party in the potential action; 
 
 338 Hoffman, Presuit Investigatory Discovery, supra note 195, at 237-38. 
 339 Holzman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 160-61. 
 340 Id. at 160. 
 341 OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(d)(1); see also Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 
77 n.139, 78 & n.146. 
 342 OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(d), staff notes 1993. 
 343 Id. 
 344 OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(d)(1). 
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(e) A request that the court issue an order authorizing the 
petitioner to obtain the discovery.345 
The court “shall” grant the petition if (1) “discovery is necessary to 
ascertain the identity of a potential adverse party”; (2) the 
“petitioner is otherwise unable to bring the contemplated action”; 
or (3) the “petitioner made reasonable efforts to” voluntarily 
obtain the information.346 
Ohio Rule 34 allows a petitioner to obtain pre-litigation 
discovery of facts that are necessary to determine if a valid cause 
of action exists against a known adverse party.347 Thus, Ohio 
courts give Ohio Rule 34 a more generous interpretation than, 
for example, New York courts do to C.P.L.R. § 3102.348 
VII. PENNSYLVANIA 
As Professor Dodson has noted, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4003.8(a) allows pre-litigation discovery “‘when the 
information sought is material and necessary to the filing of the 
complaint and the discovery will not cause unreasonable 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to any 
person or party.’”349 This is a relatively new provision, having been 
implemented only in 2007.350 There remains a dearth of authority 
on exactly how the procedure is implemented and what discovery it 
grants to plaintiffs. Under preexisting Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs 
have been allowed to initiate pre-complaint discovery by filing a 
writ of summons.351 Available discovery clearly includes oral 
depositions and written interrogatories,352 though it is unclear if it 
includes document production.353 When requesting pre-complaint 
discovery, plaintiffs must satisfy an elevated probable cause 
 
 345 Id. 
 346 OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(d)(3). 
 347 Benner v. Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 348 See supra notes 335-340 and accompanying text for relevant restrictions 
applicable to § 3102. 
 349 Dodson, New Discovery, supra note 10, at 76 (quoting PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(a)). 
 350 PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8. Previously, Pennsylvania law had authorized some pre-
complaint discovery, though not through an independent equitable action. See McNeil v. 
Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1268-79 & n.19 (Pa. 2006); Cole v. Wells, 177 A.2d 77, 80 (Pa. 1962). 
 351 See PA. R. CIV. P. 4007.1(c); McNeil, 894 A.2d at 1278 n.24. 
 352 See PA. R. CIV. P. 4001(c), (d), 4005(a), 4007.1(c). 
 353 An argument is available that the full panoply of discovery devices that 
exist under the Pennsylvania Rules should extend to pre-litigation discovery because 
there is nothing in those Rules explicitly to the contrary. See PA. R. CIV. P. 4001(c), (d). 
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania Rules applicable to oral depositions and written 
interrogatories explicitly mention pre-litigation discovery, which implies that they are 
the only discovery devices available prior to filing a complaint. 
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standard.354 Once a plaintiff satisfies its burden, the responding 
party may object, in which case the court is authorized to “require 
the plaintiff to state with particularity how the discovery will 
materially advance the preparation of the complaint.”355 
VIII. TEXAS 
The Texas provision for presuit discovery is discussed 
above.356 
 
 354 McNeil, 894 A.2d at 1278. Although McNeil pre-dates Rule 4003.8, the 
Rule’s official commentary points out that 4003.8 is a codification of the McNeil 
holding. Although Rule 4003.8’s text omits McNeil’s probable cause requirement, it has 
been imposed through judicial decision. See Cooper v. Frankford Health Care Sys., 960 
A.2d 134, 140, 142-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). 
 355 PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.8(b). 
 356 See supra notes 210-221 and accompanying text. 
